A Bridge to Nowhere? Our Energy Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars by Kalen, Sam
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law 
Volume 9 Issue 2 
2020 
A Bridge to Nowhere? Our Energy Transition and the Natural Gas 
Pipeline Wars 
Sam Kalen 
University of Wyoming College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sam Kalen, A Bridge to Nowhere? Our Energy Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, 9 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 319 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol9/iss2/3 
https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.9.2.bridge 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative 
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020 12:21 PM 
 
319 
A BRIDGE TO NOWHERE? 
OUR ENERGY TRANSITION AND 
THE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE WARS 
Sam Kalen* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 319 
 II. MOVING METHANE ............................................................... 324 
A. Sputtering Natural Gas Regulation .......................................... 324 
B. Methane: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly ................................. 330 
C. Diametrically Opposite Political Responses ................................ 333 
 III. THE NEW PIPELINE WARS .................................................... 339 
A. State, Local, and Environmental Interests ................................ 339 
B. The Pipeline Wars with Landowners ....................................... 345 
C. FERC, NEPA, and Climate Change ....................................... 352 
D. FERC’s Gas Pipeline Policy Notice of Inquiry ........................... 357 
 IV. EMBEDDED INFRASTRUCTURE AND POSSIBLY TOO  
MUCH GAS ............................................................................ 359 
 V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 375 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The nascent “pipeline wars” have supplanted the so-called war against coal. 
Less than three months into the new administration, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Administrator Scott Pruitt declared that “the war on coal is done.”1 
True. But it’s over because too many factors make steam coal unattractive in ener-
gy markets, not because traditional steam coal has an energy future. The decision 
by many electric utilities to shutter their coal plants and shift instead toward natu-
ral gas and renewables counsels consideration of a new conflict. In February 2019, 
New York University Law School’s Guarini Center hosted an event titled “Pipe-
 
 * Centennial Distinguished Professor, Associate Dean, Co-Director, Center for Law & Ener-
gy Resources for the Rockies, University of Wyoming College of Law. The author would like to thank 
KK DuVivier and Shi-Ling Hsu for their insights and helpful suggestions, as well as the editors of the 
law review for all their work. 
 1. Benjamin Storrow, Coal, Once King in Texas, Sees Wind as “Real Competitor,” E&E NEWS 
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/04/14/stories/1060053097; see also Kevin 
Bogardus, Pruitt Touts End of “War on Coal”, E&E NEWS (May 2, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060053927.  
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line Wars: The Battles Over Gas Infrastructure.”2 The Center observed that “al-
most every major pipeline project is now a legal battleground between the industry 
and activist groups.”3 Indeed, as one news source reports: 
[f]rom gas pipelines between Asia and Europe, to the web of infrastruc-
ture transporting high-carbon Alberta tar sands oil across North America, 
to pipes crisscrossing the Niger Delta and traversing the southern high-
lands of Mexico, local communities, environmentalists, social justice ac-
tivists and indigenous rights movements—and sometimes armed mili-
tants—have been fiercely resisting pipelines.4 
Protests against new pipeline infrastructure are so intense that the industry is wor-
ried about growing threats of vandalism.5 
Much is at stake. A sufficiently robust and reliable natural gas pipeline infra-
structure could supply a new dominant fuel for the electric grid. And we may need 
that supply. U.S. electric power consumption has remained fairly stable over the 
past few years, partly due to increased energy efficiency. But our energy consump-
tion has grown since 1950 and electric demand is likely to continue to grow 
through 2050.6 This growth could be slow, at roughly 1% annually.7 Projections 
suggest that natural gas consumption (for heating as well as electricity) could in-
crease between 18% and 40% from 2015 levels in that time.8 Natural gas, conse-
quently, could reign as the dominant fuel through 2050 absent countervailing poli-
cies.9 While regions with highly interconnected pipeline systems are less 
 
 2. Paul Hartman et al., Symposium at the NYU School of Law Guarini Center on Environ-
mental, Energy, and Land Use Law, Pipeline Wars: The Battles Over Gas Infrastructure Development 
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://guarinicenter.org/feb-6-2019-pipelines-wars-the-battles-over-gas-pipeline-
development/.  
 3. Id. For oil pipelines, the Petroleum Economist similarly reports how, since Keystone XL, 
“nearly every major pipeline project in the US is a battleground between the industry and activists look-
ing to derail Big Oil.” Justin Jacobs, America’s Pipeline Wars, PETROLEUM ECON. (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/midstream-downstream/pipelines/2016/americas-
pipeline-wars.  
 4. Stuart Braun, Pipeline Wars: Front Line in the Fight Against Climate Change, DW  
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/pipeline-wars-front-line-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/
a-46334177.   
 5. See Mike Soraghan, Trump Plan to Jail Protesters: Justice or ‘Un-American’?, E&E NEWS (July 
11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/11/stories/1060722755. 
 6. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., U.S. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ASSESSMENT 12 
(2018) [hereinafter EPRI]. We could experience a significant overall energy consumption decrease, 
even though electricity use might increase. Some growth is projected to occur from increased penetra-
tion from EVs, as well as “[h]eat pumps for space and water heating, along with electric technologies in 
industry and heavy transportation.” Id. at ES-7. 
 7. EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 90 (2019). 
 8. EPRI, supra note 6, at 8. 
 9. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
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vulnerable to supply disruptions, regions such as the northeast are less intercon-
nected and more susceptible to supply disruptions and power outages.10 
Pipeline infrastructure development parallels the rise in natural gas produc-
tion. Global pipeline infrastructure growth has tripled since 1996, with much of 
that growth occurring in North America and with a global average of 25 new pipe-
lines being built every year between 2009 and 2018.11 Some fear this bubble in in-
vestment, like with coal, could burst.12 “The world,” after all, “for which many 
North American pipelines are being built may no longer exist by the time they are 
completed.”13 Projects are highly leveraged and cost anywhere from $8 million to 
upwards of $15 million per mile—with the Mountain Valley Pipeline projected to 
cost over $5 billion.14 These projects may need at least a potentially unworkable 30 
plus-year period for a sufficient capital repayment and return on investment.15 In-
deed, the same is true for export facilities for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) devel-
opment—we could be facing yet another stranded asset accompanying old coal-
fired power plants if we continue to construct new LNG facilities.16 One report 
suggests “the scale of the LNG expansion under development is as large or greater 
 
 10. See NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., SPECIAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT: 
POTENTIAL BULK POWER SYSTEM IMPACTS DUE TO SEVERE DISRUPTIONS ON THE NATURAL GAS 
SYSTEM viii (2017). According to NERC, “many areas in North America could incur power flow and 
stability issues if they were to experience significant losses of natural gas infrastructure. This accentu-
ates the need for system operators and planners to conduct their own system studies around loss of 
pipeline infrastructure and to develop contingency plans.” Id. at 27. 
 11. TED NACE, LYDIA PLANTE & JAMES BROWNING, PIPELINE BUBBLE: NORTH AMERICA IS 
BETTING OVER $1 TRILLION ON A RISKY FOSSIL INFRASTRUCTURE BOOM 4 (2019), 
https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GFITPipelineBubble_2019_v6.pdf. 
 12. Id. at 3; see also Carlos Anchondo, Natural Gas Facing Same Fate as Coal, E&E NEWS (Sept. 
10, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061111699 (describing Rocky Mountain Institute study). 
 13. NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 11, at 13. GE, for instance, announced closing a 
natural gas plant years early as a consequence of the shift toward renewables. David Ferris, GE Shutters 
Gas Plant Decades Early As Renewables Surge, E&E NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060652109. 
 14. Niina H. Farah, Mountain Valley Costs Spike After FERC Order, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/23/stories/1061349975.  
 15. NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 11, at 13. Depreciation may track the economic 
life of a project, while the physical or average service life might be different. FERC might assume a 35-
year natural gas supply, while the latest Energy Information Administration only predicts out to 2050 
(a 30-year period), and yet in some proceedings FERC examines need over a 20-year period. Spire STL 
Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018). The IRS uses different classes of infrastructure and accom-
panying periods for depreciation, and the Commission requires asset accounting reporting. 18 C.F.R. § 
201 (2012). 
 16. TED NACE, LYDIA PLANTE & JAMES BROWNING, THE NEW GAS BOOM: TRACKING 
GLOBAL LNG INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2019), https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/06/NewGasBoomEmbargo.pdf. One report describing shuttering a coal plant roughly 20 years too 
early (economically) suggests ratepayers might be shouldered with $1 billion in costs over those two 
decades. Jeffrey Tomich, ‘Stranded Costs’ Mount as Coal Vanishes from the Grid, E&E NEWS (May 29, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060419079. 
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than the expansion of coal-fired power plants, posing a direct challenge to Paris 
climate goals.”17 
Yet, as the nation builds out its natural gas infrastructure, will this shift to-
ward natural gas be as a bridge fuel, or something more?18 Even the notion of a 
“bridge fuel” is problematic, however. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change warns that CO2 emissions must crest by 2030 and fall to a net zero by 2050 
if we hope to limit global climate warming to 1.5oC by the close of the century.19 
Achievement of this goal is almost certain to require long-term reduction in natural 
gas usage, although the need to eliminate natural gas may be mitigated somewhat 
by the development of carbon capture and sequestration technology. To limit tem-
perature increases to 1.5oC requires that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will 
need to decline between 40% and 60% below 2010 levels by 2030 and then reach a 
net negative by 2050.20 When, for instance, the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee held a hearing in July 2019 on decarbonizing the economy by 2050—
the widely shared objective—no unanimity surfaced for natural gas’ future role.21 
Many believe we will need changes in the transportation sector, renewables, energy 
efficiency, and new advancements in nuclear energy, and most likely some path-
ways for carbon capture and removal.22 A Union of Concerned Scientists’ witness 
testified how “deep cuts” in methane emissions will be “necessary,” and likely in-
clude retaining natural gas but with accompanying carbon capture and sequestra-
tion (CCS).23 A utility industry representative testified that “fossil fuels must be 
 
 17. NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 16, at 3. 
 18. A gas trade association affiliated study posits that gas is a destination not a bridge fuel. See 
Jenny Mandel, Natural Gas Is a Destination Fuel, Not a Bridge—Study, E&E NEWS (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/05/08/stories/1060292999. 
 19. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5OC at 95 (Oct. 2018); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC at 13-14 
(Oct. 8, 2018) [hereinafter SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS]. If we cannot achieve this goal, reductions 
in net emissions must occur to limit warming. 
 20. SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 19, at 12. 
 21. See Sean Reilly, Hearing Starts Dems’ March Toward ‘Net-Zero’ Emissions, E&E NEWS (July 
25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060784811. 
 22. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, CHAIRMAN FRANK PALLONE, JR., 
MEMORANDUM: HEARING ON “BUILDING AMERICA’S CLEAN FUTURE: PATHWAYS TO 
DECARBONIZE THE ECONOMY” (July 22, 2019), https://energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/072419%20Briefing%20Memo_ECC%20
Hearing_2019.07.24_Deep%20Decarbonization.pdf.  
 23. Creating a Climate Resilient America: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on the Climate 
Crisis, 116th Cong. 1, 5 (2019) (Statement of Dr. Rachel Cleetus, Policy Director, Climate and Energy 
Program, Union of Concerned Scientists). Dr. Cleetus added that “[n]atural gas with CCS could be a 
contributor to a net-zero world.” See Reilly, supra note 21. Deep decarbonization may require some form 
of carbon capture, and institutional mechanisms capable of allowing it to move forward. See Wendy B. 
Jacobs & Michael Craig, Legal Pathways to Widespread Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11022 (2017). “CCS refers to the process of capturing, compressing, transporting, and then inject-
ing compressed CO2 into underground geologic formations for storage.” Tara K. Righetti, Correlative 
_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020  12:21 PM 
Spring 2020] The Natural Gas Pipeline Wars 323 
 
accompanied by robust innovation in carbon capture, utilization and storage in the 
production and use of fossil fuels.”24 Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz’s En-
ergy Futures Initiative cautions that continued use of natural gas will require car-
bon capture, utilization, and storage.25 A senior fellow at the World Resources In-
stitute similarly observed that, “regardless of whether one believes that CCS 
technology will be needed for electricity generation, the technology is very likely 
to be needed for the job of carbon dioxide removal,” as well as for reducing emis-
sions from the industrial sector.26 Of course, not all agree.27 And still others posit 
that carbon capture must be accompanied by negative emission technologies and 
direct air capture (DAC). A Rhodium Group analysis champions DAC and further 
suggests that the United States “is well-positioned to foster development of DAC 
with sequestration.”28 Consequently, a deeply decarbonized future will require ei-
ther effective carbon capture and storage capacity for natural gas plants, as the 
Rhodium Group and others advocate, or removing natural gas as a fuel source by 
roughly 2030. 
This article chronicles how natural gas has replaced coal as today’s energy di-
lemma. The pipeline wars illustrate landowners’ concern with special treatment for 
industry seeking to condemn lands, while some states and the public object to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC or Commission) approach to 
approving new pipeline projects, or the Commission’s assessment of GHG emis-
sions associated with project development. 
 
Rights and Limited Common Property in the Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass in 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10420, 10422 (2017). 
 24. “Building America’s Clean Energy Future: Pathways to Decarbonize the Economy:” Hearing Before 
the House Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (Statement of Shan-
non Angielski, Executive Director, Carbon Utilization Research Council). A noted demonstration plant 
would be Net Power’s La Porte, Texas project. See, e.g., James Conca, Net Zero Natural Gas Plant—The 
Game Changer, FORBES (July 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/07/31/net-zero-
natural-gas-plant-the-game-changer/. CCS can be employed to capture methane during the production 
process as well. See, e.g., Carbon Capture and Storage, https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/
environment-and-technology/carbon-capture-and-storage/ (Jan 27, 2020) (Norwegian CCS activity). 
 25. ENERGY FUTURES INITIATIVE, THE GREEN REAL DEAL: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ACHIEVING A DEEPLY DECARBONIZED ECONOMY 25 (Aug. 2019). 
 26.  “Building America’s Clean Energy Future: Pathways to Decarbonize the Economy:” Hearing Before 
the House Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change, 116th Cong. 2, 3 (2019) (Statement of Dr. 
Karl Hausk, World Resources Institute). 
 27. An upcoming analysis suggests natural gas is not a bridge fuel and we ought to avoid cou-
pling it with CCS. Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of Coal and Natural Gas With Carbon Capture as Pro-
posed Solutions to Global Warming, Air Pollution, and Energy Security, in 100% CLEAN, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY STORAGE FOR EVERYTHING (Cambridge U. Press forthcoming), available at 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/NatGasVsWWS&coal.pdf. 
 28. RHODIUM GRP., CAPTURING LEADERSHIP: POLICIES FOR THE US TO ADVANCE DIRECT 
AIR CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY 7 (May 2019). DAC is one form of carbon capture technology, and it 
requires binding the CO2 with a bonding agent and then separating out a pure stream of CO2. See gen-
erally Tracy Hester, Legal Pathways to Negative Emission Technologies and Direct Air Capture of Greenhouse 
Gases, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10413 (2018). 
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Part II examines the pipeline wars in their historical context, portraying the 
rise of natural gas regulation, its increasing dominance as a fuel source, its associat-
ed environmental consequences, and the marked differences in how the Obama and 
Trump administrations have treated natural gas. Part III describes and analyzes 
three principal matters collectively displaying the challenges confronting the in-
dustry: (1) the Commission’s approach toward conditionally approving pipelines 
before states can ensure construction activities will comply with the Clean Water 
Act (CWA); (2) the Commission’s willingness to allow pipeline condemnation 
proceedings to occur before landowners have an opportunity to thoroughly air 
their concerns; and (3) FERC’s unwillingness to examine the indirect upstream 
and downstream effects from increased GHG emissions associated with approving 
a pipeline. This Part also discusses FERC’s 2018 Notice of Inquiry, soliciting input 
on the Commission’s pipeline policies. Next, Part IV addresses the principal, loom-
ing questions in the pipeline wars: whether and how the Commission ought to 
reexamine the need for new natural gas pipeline infrastructure. Major energy tran-
sitions present major challenges, and the resultant follies from these efforts 
abound.29 If we fail to avoid yet another folly, our new natural gas infrastructure 
could become either a shackle, impeding a zero-carbon energy future, or a bridge to 
nowhere. 
II.  MOVING METHANE 
A.  Sputtering Natural Gas Regulation 
Modern natural gas regulation is a product of tortured, disjointed—and some 
may say flailing—efforts.30 Early in the twentieth century, natural gas escaped into 
the atmosphere as an unwanted byproduct of oil production.31 The markets and 
technology for capturing and transporting that gas had not yet surfaced,32 leaving 
oil producers with little incentive to fret about the escaping gas.33 State rate and 
 
 29. See generally ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & SAM KALEN, ENERGY FOLLIES: MISSTEPS, 
FIASCOS, AND SUCCESS OF AMERICA’S ENERGY POLICY (2018) (passim). 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. See ARLON R. TUSSING & BOB TIPPEE, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, 
STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 79-80 (2d ed. 1995). 
 32. As one producer averred, “no machinery or process of any kind has ever by the highest skill 
been devised or known to the world whereby in such a case the oil in such well can be produced and 
saved, unless at the same time such natural gas as may be in such well is suffered to escape.” Ohio Oil 
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 199 (1900). 
 33. TUSSING & TIPPEE, supra note 31, at 80. The common law rule of capture, allowing a sur-
face owner to access reserves even when those reserves underlie adjacent property, eventually contribut-
ed toward the pressure to develop technology for “long-distance pipelines.” Id. at 81. 
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conservation regulation emerged early in the twentieth century,34 but a regulatory 
gap surfaced quickly after the Supreme Court held that states lacked the authority 
to regulate rates for interstate transportation.35 
Congress responded with the 1938 Natural Gas Act (NGA), establishing the 
original contours for federal regulation of natural gas in interstate markets.36 Con-
gress decided to regulate the growing natural gas industry under a public utility 
model.37 As Justice Douglas explained, “the ‘basic purpose’ of this legislation was 
‘to occupy’ the field . . . [in an area where the Court] had held the States might not 
act.”38 
The NGA delegated to the Federal Power Commission (FPC, now FERC) 
the authority to establish “just and reasonable” rates for interstate transportation 
and interstate sales for resale of natural gas.39 The NGA also gave the FPC power 
to grant certificates authorizing the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, the 
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, and the construction and op-
eration of facilities for such sale and transportation.40 Regulated companies cannot 
cease operating such facilities or terminate certificated transportation and sales un-
less granted abandonment by the Commission.41 Retail sales for ultimate public 
 
 34. The Supreme Court rejected claims that state conservation programs denied owners of their 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights (e.g., taking of their property). Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 
177 U.S. 190, 212 (1900). The Court’s judgment, however, flowed from its application of the rule of 
capture: “[t]he proposition, then, which denies the power in the state to regulate by law the manner in 
which the gas and oil may be appropriated, and thus prevent their destruction, of necessity involves the 
assertion that there can be no right of ownership in and to the oil and gas before the same have been 
actually appropriated by being brought into the possession of some particular person.” Id. at 201. 
 35. In Missouri v. Kan. Nat. Gas, 265 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court held that states lacked regula-
tory authority over the rates charged by interstate pipelines, precipitating the need for Congress to fill a 
regulatory gap. That gap later became significant once the Federal Trade Commission issued a scathing 
roughly 600 page report chronicling the gas industry’s monopolistic practices—and encouraging con-
gressional action. See Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural 
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 345 (1983). For a concise history of the NGA, see Donald J. 
Libert, Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938); see also Pub. L. No. 83-323, 
68 Stat. 36 (1954) (amending NGA to allow states to regulate as a matter of local concern interstate 
activity if the gas is consumed in the origin state). 
 37. The public utility model affords the industry a monopoly franchise covering a particular 
territory in return for acceding to rate regulation and an obligation to serve those in the franchise terri-
tory. Common carrier obligations, however, originally attended pipeline rights-of-way under the Min-
eral Leasing Act, but Congress extinguished that obligation in 1953. Pub. L. No. 253, 67 Stat. 557 
(1953). 
 38. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944) (citing H. REP. No. 
709, 75th Cong., at 2 (1937)). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2018). 
 40. The NGA confers jurisdiction on the FPC to regulate, inter alia, “the sale in interstate 
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018). 
 41. Natural Gas Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (2018). 
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consumption, and “production and gathering,” were specifically exempted from the 
Commission’s jurisdiction.42 
In June 1954, the Supreme Court infamously interpreted the NGA as tasking 
the FPC with the authority and obligation to regulate natural gas producers’ 
wholesale sales of natural gas in interstate commerce.43 This set in motion a chain 
of events that propelled the FPC on a path of natural gas producer regulation with 
unforeseen and extraordinarily disruptive consequences for the natural gas indus-
try, the economies of gas-consuming states, and ultimately for U.S. energy securi-
ty.44 It triggered interstate natural gas shortages, impractical FPC gas “curtail-
ment” (i.e., shortage management) policies,45 and eventually congressional 
intervention with the passage in 1978 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).46 
President Carter announced that the NGPA would “give us a new national market, 
making available new supplies of natural gas, which will be at a lower price than 
competitive foreign oil.”47 While the NGPA ostensibly resolved interstate natural 
gas shortages, by the end of the decade the country was finally enjoying a natural 
gas surplus.48 The Act removed disincentives to sell gas into the interstate market, 
and interstate pipelines replenished their depleted gas supplies.49 But gas once 
again became less economical by 1986, as oil prices declined considerably.50 Con-
gress shortly thereafter passed the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 to remove 
some of the remnants of producer price controls not lifted in the NGPA.51 
 
 42. Natural Gas Act §§ 1(b), 4, 5, 7; 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018); e.g., ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. 
v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding FERC’s approach toward offshore gathering 
lines). 
 43. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). 
 44. See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at ch. 5. The factors surrounding the Phillips deci-
sion are fascinating, and those who defended the decision, such as one of Illinois’ senators, championed 
the need to protect residential natural gas consumers against excessive rates. See Hon. Paul H. Douglas, 
The Case for the Consumer of Natural Gas, 44 GEO. L.J. 566, 575 (1956). 
 45. See generally Stephen Breyer & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regula-
tion of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973). Producer representatives warned in the 
1950s that producers would opt to sell gas locally rather than into the regulated interstate market. See 
Rayburn L. Foster, Natural-Gas Regulation from the Producers’ Standpoint, 44 GEO. L.J. 658, 672-75 
(1956). Interstate pipelines consequently would need to spread their fixed costs across fewer sources—
forcing increased costs to those customers. Id. at 672-73. 
 46. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978). See generally Rob-
ert R. Nordhaus, Producer Regulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RES. J. 4 (1979). 
 47. Natural Gas Legislation, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1452 (Aug. 18, 1978) (remarking on 
the conference committees’ reports on the NGPA).  
 48. See J.P. Smith, Natural Gas Glut: Experts Agree that Outlook Has Changed Dramatically, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1978, A1. 
 49. See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 90-92. 
 50. Paul L. Joskow, Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States, 103 AMER. 
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 338, 339 (2013). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989). Existing NGPA “controls misdirect[ed] scare ex-
ploration capital by setting artificially high and low ‘ceiling prices’ that still cover[ed] about one-third of 
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This turmoil subsided somewhat as FERC began restructuring the industry. 
As Judge Stephen Williams, a prominent energy jurist, would later write, “[i]n the 
Spring of 1985, as Mikhail Gorbachev was assuming the duties of General Secre-
tary and inaugurating perestroika, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
launched its own restructuring of the natural gas industry.”52 The Commission be-
gan issuing orders affording interstate pipelines broad, flexible authority to provide 
various types of transportation services, on the condition the companies would of-
fer those services on a nondiscriminatory, open access basis.53 As part of this indus-
try restructuring, FERC forced the unbundling of services, with only a limited 
ability for pipelines to market their own gas; and the Commission provided for 
blanket pipelines sales certificates, with pre-granted authority for abandonment, a 
capacity reallocation mechanism, a comparability standard, a confirmation of 
straight fixed variable rate design, along with transition cost recovery.54 This effec-
tively transformed the natural gas industry from one where pipelines bought natu-
ral gas and then resold it in a bundled transaction that included both gas acquisi-
tion costs and pipeline transportation, to a regime where pipelines were primarily 
transporters of gas produced and sold entirely outside the ambit of price regula-
tion. This transformation resulted in pipeline companies transporting only 21% of 
their own gas in 1992, down from about 92% in 1984.55 
Congress facilitated the gas industry’s transition by including several gas-
related provisions in omnibus energy bills, beginning with the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992.56 For example, it relieved independent producers from the Alternative 
Minimum Tax.57 It also notably sought to promote unconventional gas develop-
ment, and it implicitly boosted natural gas in a title on Global Climate Change 
when it called for developing a least-cost and reduced greenhouse gas energy strat-
egy.58 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included additional carrots for the industry, 
such as streamlining provisions and allowing companies to provide storage at mar-
ket based rates, while also directing price transparency and strengthening rules 
 
our nation’s total gas supplies,” producing “[d]istorted overinvestment in low-flowing but artificially 
high-priced wells, and underinvestment in more prolific but artificially low-priced wells.” Natural Gas 
Decontrol Act of 1989, Rep. 101-29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1989). 
 52. Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 53. NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 93-94. 
 54. Id. at 94; see also Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: 
Will the Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring, 15 ENERGY L.J. 273 
(1994). 
 55. Don Santa & Patricia Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14 
ENERGY L.J. 1, 7 (1993). 
 56. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
 57. Id. § 1915. 
 58. See id. §§ 201-02. In Title II, Congress removed barriers to imports and exports of natural 
gas with countries with Free Trade Agreements, 106 Stat. 2866, and declared the sense of Congress 
“that natural gas consumers and producers, and the national economy, are best served by a competitive 
natural gas wellhead market,” and in Title XVI it addressed global climate change. 106 Stat. 2999.  
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against market manipulation.59 During this time, industrial, residential, and overall 
natural gas usage increased annually and eventually surpassed coal as the nation’s 
primary source of energy production.60 
Today, a proposal for an interstate natural gas pipeline must demonstrate to 
FERC that the line serves the public interest to merit a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity (§ 7 Certificate).61 If a pipeline serves the public conven-
ience and necessity, the NGA directs the Commission to issue a certificate—
possibly with conditions.62 The Commission accepts pre-construction contract 
commitments (precedent agreements), with shippers committing to use a set per-
centage of the pipeline’s capacity to demonstrate a market need for the natural 
gas.63 These commitments generally occur during what is called an open season, 
when the pipeline advertises its project and solicits from prospective shippers a 
commitment to use a percentage of the pipeline’s capacity. Once shippers commit 
to enough capacity, companies typically apply for a blanket certificate.64 This gen-
 
 59. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 688 (2005). In Order Nos. 
678 and 678-A, the Commission adopted market-based rates for storage. Order 678, Rate Regulation of 
Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities (June 19, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284); Order on 
Clarification and Rehearing 678-A, Rate Regulation of Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities (Nov. 16, 
2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284). 
 60. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW AUGUST 2017, at 4, 6 
(2017). The 1990s’ gas restructuring likely contributed toward the status we presumably now enjoy with 
our present shale gas revolution and seeming natural gas abundance. It sent clear market signals to pro-
ducers and afforded incentives for cost-effective new technologies—including more efficient combined 
cycle gas turbines capable of serving as baseload resources. 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2018). 
 62. Id. FERC typically phrases its obligation as mandatory if it concludes that a project serves 
the public convenience and necessity, while courts occasionally note the “Commission may issue a cer-
tificate” if it so finds. E.g., Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1307 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015). 
 63. See Appalachian Voices v. FERC, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199, at *1 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 19, 
2019) (allowing a precedent agreement with an affiliated entity); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1359, 
1379 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Precedent agreements are temporary, replaced later by Firm Transportation 
Service Agreements. FERC may reject terms in a precedent agreement before being approved. See 
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, at paras. 97-106 (2017); Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp., 97 FERC ¶ 61,221 (2001) (discussing non-conforming provisions); see also infra notes 255-62 
(discussing precedent agreements). 
 64. 18 C.F.R. Parts 157.204 (2018). As FERC explains: 
[u]nder a blanket certificate issued pursuant to section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, a natural 
gas company may undertake a restricted array of routine activities without the need to ob-
tain a case-specific certificate for each individual project. The blanket certificate program 
provides an administratively efficient means to enable a company to construct, modify, ac-
quire, operate, and abandon a limited set of natural gas facilities, and offer a limited set of 
services, provided each activity complies with constraints on costs and environmental im-
pacts set forth in the Commission’s regulations.”  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Blanket Certificates, INDUSTRIES, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/gas/indus-act/blank-cert.asp (as of March 19, 2019). 
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erally occurs only after the company engages in extensive pre-filing outreach with 
interested stakeholders and permitting authorities.65 A general certificate condition 
requires documentation of receipt of all applicable federal environmental authori-
zations before proceeding with construction.66 Once the Commission issues a § 7 
certificate, § 7(h) entitles the certificate holder to acquire the necessary property 
interests for constructing the approved facilities, including by exercising eminent 
domain authority.67 
The regulatory authority over exports and imports of natural gas is split be-
tween FERC and the Secretary of Energy. Section 3 of the original NGA delegat-
ed authority over both imports and exports of natural gas, or correspondingly liq-
uefied natural gas, to the FPC.68 Congress instructed the Commission to allow an 
import or export, “unless, after opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed 
exportation or importation will not be consistent with the public interest.”69 When 
 
 65. See Robert Christin et al., Considering the Public Convenience and Necessity in Pipeline Certifi-
cate Cases Under the Natural Gas Act, 38 ENERGY L.J. 115, 131 (2017). 
 66. E.g., Spire STL Pipeline L.L.C., 164 FERC 61,085 at App. para. 9 (Aug. 3, 2018) (requir-
ing compliance with environmental conditions, “Spire must receive written authorization from the Di-
rector of OEP before commencing construction of any project facilities. To obtain such authorization, Spire 
must file with the Secretary documentation that it has received all applicable authorizations required 
under federal law (or evidence of waiver thereof)”); see also Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 169 FERC ¶ 
61,051 at 41, App. B (2019) (requiring compliance with environmental conditions outlined in Appendix 
B). 
 67. The company can choose to file a proceeding in either state or federal court:  
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by con-
tract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, 
the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for 
the transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or other property, in addition to 
right-of-way, for the location of compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or 
equipment necessary to the proper operation of such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire 
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United 
States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. The 
practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of 
the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in simi-
lar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated: Provided, 
That the United States district courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount 
claimed by the owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000. 
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018). Congress, consistent with the Commission’s recommendation, added this 
provision in 1947. Pub. L. No. 80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947). Congress noted that it granted eminent do-
main authority to hydroelectric facilities and neglected including a similar provision in the NGA. This 
then became problematic in states where pipelines could not use condemnation authority. Amendments 
to the Natural Gas Act: Hearings on S. 734 and S. 1028 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11 (Apr. 29, July 1, 1947). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018), Pub. L. No. 688, 52 Stat. 821, 822 (1938). 
 69. Id. Also, “[t]he Commission” was granted authority to “grant such application, in whole or 
in part, with such modification and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may find neces-
sary or appropriate.” Id. Federal authority over imports in § 3 flows from the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. See Distrigas Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 495 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Border 
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Congress passed the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 and estab-
lished FERC (replacing the FPC), it transferred § 3 authority to the newly estab-
lished Secretary of Energy, “unless the Secretary assigns such a function to the 
Commission.”70 The discussion then surrounding LNG focused on issues sur-
rounding imports.71 In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress ensured that FERC 
would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the siting, construction, expansion, and 
operation of LNG export and import facilities. Congress incorporated specific pro-
visions designed to streamline the permitting and environmental review processes 
for such facilities.72 Congress also directed the Commission to promulgate regula-
tions for complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and to 
ensure that interested stakeholders would be involved in a pre-filing process for 
any proposed LNG facility.73 The Commission responded with rules designed to 
encourage additional natural gas infrastructure, including LNG terminals.74 
B.  Methane: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly 
Several years ago, Exelon’s CEO John Rowe acknowledged the dethroning of 
King Coal, as he and other utility CEO’s effectively anointed gas as a new bridge 
fuel to a cleaner energy economy.75 The shale revolution, after all, fundamentally 
altered the energy landscape. The combination of hydraulic fracking and horizontal 
drilling catapulted natural gas to an abundant resource in the U.S.76 On the pro-
duction side, however, contamination from fracking quickly surfaced as an initial 
 
Pipeline Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 171 F.2d 149, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1948). For a discussion of the 
line between § 3 and § 7 authority, see Sound Energy Solutions, 107 FERC ¶ 61,263 (2004). 
 70. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 585 (1977). 
 71. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 4.26 (1977). The General Accounting Office believed that Carter’s plan un-
der-estimated future natural gas demand, and thus over-estimated the likely amount of LNG imports. 
Id. at 427. 
 72. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 685-86 (2005). While Congress vested the Commission 
with exclusive jurisdiction over the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of LNG facilities, it 
added a caveat that “nothing in this Act is intended to affect otherwise applicable law related to any 
Federal agency’s authorities or responsibilities related to LNG terminals.” Id. 
 73. Id. at 689. Congress focused particularly on ensuring that state and local authorities would 
be consulted on matters involving state and local safety. Id. at 687. 
 74. FERC, FACT SHEET: ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 4 (2006), 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/epact-fact-sheet.pdf. For a treatment of LNG issues during the peri-
od immediately prior to and after the 2005 Act, see Shelia Slocum Holis, Liquefied Natural Gas: “The Big 
Picture” for Future Development in North America, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2007). 
 75. Utility CEO Support EPA’s New Air-Quality Standards, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 8, 2011), 
https://thinkprogress.org/utility-ceo-support-epas-new-air-quality-standards-9409c7973859/.  
 76. Richard J. Pierce, Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All Our Major Problems, 4 ENERGY & 
ENVTL. L. 22 (2013). 
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cause célèbre.77 Yet, regardless of contamination concerns and the likelihood of in-
creased earthquakes in certain regions, natural gas’ abundance, low cost, diminished 
health risks when compared with coal, and its reduced long-term potency as a 
GHG made it an attractive fuel source. The years prior to the shale revolution, 
when writers predicted a high noon for natural gas,78 morphed into conversations 
about gas powering the globe.79 
Natural gas undoubtedly is cleaner than coal, but it too comes at a cost. Natu-
ral gas is primarily methane—ranging between 70% to 98% by volume.80 By late 
2017, “the global mean methane concentration was nearly triple that of preindustri-
al times,” having risen dramatically during the 1900s—and while leveling off 
somewhat recently has experienced another rise since the shale gas boom.81 Atmos-
pheric anthropogenic methane originates from a variety of sources, such as cows,82 
melting permafrost,83 and landfills.84 And while EPA’s GHG inventory reports 
 
 77. See generally Bryan Walsh, The Gas Dilemma, TIME, at 41, 42 (Apr, 11, 2011); see also Tala 
Hadavi, How Fracking Changed America Forever, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/01/06/the-impact-of-fracking-on-us-consumers-and-local-communities.html; Pamela King, A Dec-
ade of Fracking Research: What Have We Learned?, E&E NEWS (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060087955 (summary exposé of the history); Mike Lee, How a Death 
in Texas Shaped Gas-Boom Regulation, E&E NEWS, July 5, 2018 (additional summary). 
 78. E.g., JULIAN DARLEY, HIGH NOON FOR NATURAL GAS: THE NEW ENERGY CRISIS 
(2004). 
 79. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 76, at 6-7; Walsh, supra note 77. 
 80. NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION 
DRILLING & PRODUCTION 10 (2d ed. 2001). 
 81. A CONSENSUS STUDY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, 
IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF ANTHROPOGENIC METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1-2 (2018). 
 82. See Daniel Cusick, For Climate-Smart Farmers, Carbon Solution is in the Soil, E&E NEWS (Ju-
ly 1, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060681577 (noting that livestock production accounts for 
roughly 40% of agriculture’s contribution toward emissions); cf. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Cow Manure: An Un-
expected Climate Solution, E&E NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/
stories/1060367345. 
 83. Merritt R. Turetsky et al., Permafrost Collapse is Accelerating Carbon Release, 569 NATURE 32 
(Apr. 30, 2019); Katey Walter Anthony et al., 21st-Century Modeled Permafrost Carbon Emissions Accelerat-
ed by Abrupt Thaw Beneath Lakes, 2 NATURE COMM. 3262 (2018). 
 84. See generally Ellen M. Gilmer, Court Orders Agency to Address Landfill Emissions, E&E NEWS 
(May 7, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060286903; Nina Heikkinen, White House Sped Review 
of Methane Rule Delay, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060104929 (dis-
cussing landfills). 
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that methane releases have broadly decreased since 1990,85 it appears that since 
2006, methane releases are rising.86 
Methane reduction presents an opportunity for arresting rising GHG emis-
sions before 2050. It is, as Professor Steven Ferrey notes, “the second most perni-
cious warming chemical after CO2.”
87 As the National Academy of Science ob-
serves, “[e]ven though” methane “has much lower atmospheric abundance than 
carbon dioxide,” it absorbs 20 to 25 times more energy per unit mass than carbon 
dioxide does.88 Its relatively short life-span—some estimates range between 12 and 
less than 10 years—provides a unique opportunity for reducing present atmospher-
ic GHGs.89 Although scientists dispute the actual amount of emissions during oil 
and gas production,90 the National Academy suggests that approximately 25% of 
U.S. methane emissions are from natural gas systems—excluding even the end use 
of the gas.91 
Methane emissions also contribute toward other environmental and health 
problems. Ground level ozone, for instance, forms when oxides of nitrogen react 
 
 85. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2017 ES-8 
(2019). EPA identified enteric fermentation from livestock, natural gas systems, and landfill gas as the 
three principal sources. Id.; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF 
ANTHROPOGENIC METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2018) [hereinafter NAS] (using 
2015 data: natural gas – 25%, petroleum – 6%, enteric fermentation – 25%, manure management – 10%, 
rice cultivation – 2%, landfills – 18%, wastewater – 2%, coal mining – 10%). 
 86. Id. at 1-2, 24. 
 87. Seven Ferrey, The Second Element, First Priority, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 41, 43 (2018). 
 88. NAS, supra note 85, at 21. Although others believe the number is higher, EPA indicates that 
methane is 25 times more potent over a 100-year period than CO2. EPA, GLOBAL NON-CO2 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PROJECTIONS & MITIGATION: 2015-2050 at 4 (Sept. 2019). Steven 
Ferrey posits that our assumption that CH4 is only 25 times more potent than CO2 considerably under-
estimates its potency. Ferrey, supra note 87, at 45-47. 
 89. NAS, supra note 85, at 21 (Reducing methane emissions could have outsized near-term cli-
mate change reduction impacts due to its disproportionately large greenhouse effect. But because me-
thane doesn’t linger long in the atmosphere, its reduction has fewer long-term benefits.).  
 90. John Fialka, Researchers Say Methane Estimates at Gas Wells Were Wrong, E&E NEWS (May 
16, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060341025 (describing a report on recent American methane 
emissions by Xin Lan et. al., Long-Term Measurements Show Little Evidence for Large Increases in total U.S. 
Methane Emissions Over the Past Decade, 46 GEO. RES. LETRS. 49991 (May 2019)). For a comprehensive 
earlier study by World Resources Institute, see JAMES BRADBURY ET AL., CLEARING THE AIR: 
REDUCING UPSTREAM GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM U.S. NATURAL GAS SYSTEMS (2013). 
 91. NAS, supra note 85, at 29, 52-60 (noting five principal aspects: well sites, gathering and 
boosting stations, processing plans, transmission facilities, and petroleum production wells). Recent 
studies suggest that local natural gas distribution systems are releasing more methane than previously 
thought. See Sid Perkins, Major U.S. Cities Are Leaking Methane at Twice the Rate Previously Believed, 
SCI., July 19, 2019 (discussing methane emissions from cities on the US East Coast). And other recent 
studies suggest we are underestimating the overall level of methane emissions. Chris Mooney, Methane 
is a Hard-Hitting Greenhouse Gas. Now Scientists Say We’ve Dramatically Underestimated How Much We’re 
Emitting, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/
2020/02/19/were-vastly-undercounting-methane-emissions-fossil-fuels-scientists-say/. 
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with volatile organic compounds—such as methane—in the presence of sunlight.92 
This affects air quality, particularly for sensitive populations, and it can adversely 
affect a range of resources, such as forests, parks, and wildlife.93 
C.  Diametrically Opposite Political Responses 
Once it initiated efforts to reduce CO2 emissions from the transportation sec-
tor and electric utilities, the Obama Administration addressed methane emissions. 
It set a goal to reduce emissions from the oil and gas sector 40-plus percent below 
2012 levels by 2025.94 EPA exercised authority under the CAA to regulate me-
thane emissions from new sources in the oil and gas industry.95 The Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) followed with two regulations. The first targeted frack-
ing on public lands.96 The second was an exercise of BLM authority under the 
 
 92. See Ground-Level Ozone Pollution, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ground-level-ozone-
pollution/ground-level-ozone-basics#formation (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). 
 93. Western states in particular must address regional haze from fossil-fuel production and gen-
eration. Ground level ozone, for instance, “arrived in force more than a decade ago in [Wyoming’s] Jo-
nah and Pinedale gas field.” Heather Richards, Dramatic Ozone Spikes Puzzle Regulators, Locals in Wyo-
ming Gas Field, TRIBE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://trib.com/business/energy/dramatic-ozone-spikes-puzzle-
regulators-locals-in-wyoming-gas-field/article_82837053-a70d-5591-b4a4-e83c24e8565b.html. West 
Texas residents are impacted by emissions from the Permian Basin. See Paul Stinson, Permian Basin 
Pollution Lacks Texas Monitoring, Report Claims, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (May 10, 2019), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/permian-basin-pollution-lacks-
texas-monitoring-report-claims; see also Mike Lee, Oil, Gas Emissions Linked to Health Problems-Study, 
E&E NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061308063. EPA’s alleged failure to ad-
dress the health effects from ozone-forming oil and gas industry emissions may trigger a lawsuit de-
signed to tighten regulations. See Sean Reilly, Enviros Threaten to Sue EPA Over Oil and Gas Guidelines, 
E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061357769. 
 94. Dan Utech, Administration Takes Historic Action to Reduce Methane Emissions for the Oil and 
Gas Sector, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 12, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2016/05/12/administration-takes-historic-action-reduce-methane-emission-oil-and-gas-sector. The 
four key sectors identified for methane emissions were landfills, coal mines, agriculture, and oil and gas. 
WHITE HOUSE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN STRATEGY TO REDUCE METHANE (2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-
03-28_final.pdf. For natural gas systems, the administration identified “15 percent from processing, 34 
percent from transmission and storage, and 20 percent from distribution.” Id. The administration de-
veloped several programs for reducing emissions. See DOE, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW: 
ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE S-26 (2015) [hereinafter 
QER-1]; see also Avery Fellow, Clinton Announces International Coalition to Help Countries Cut Methane, 
Black Carbon, E&E NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059960128. 
 95. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824 
(June 3, 2016); see also Source Determination for Certain Emission Units in the Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector, 81 Fed. Reg. 35622 (June 3, 2016). 
 96. Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16128 (Mar. 26, 2015). A 
district court enjoined the rule, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2016 WL 3509415 (D. Wyo. 2016), 
and the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal as unripe, Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 
2017), all by the time the Trump administration issued a rescission of the 2015 rule. Rescission of a 2015 
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,924 (Dec. 29, 2017) (rescission of 2015 rule). 
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Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) and Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) to regulate methane venting and flaring on public lands,97 including the 
over a billion cubic feet of natural gas being vented or flared in the Permian Basin 
and Bakken shale formations alone.98 In 2018, expanding oil production in the 
Bakken and Permian formations contributed to a 48% increase in flaring national-
ly.99 One estimate suggests that the industry emits roughly 13 million metric tons 
of methane annually—in 2015, this was 60% more methane than EPA reported.100 
The National Academy of Sciences suggests, consequently, that the federal gov-
ernment must develop and implement better tools for measuring, inventorying, 
and monitoring methane emissions.101 
 
 97. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016); see generally Ellen M. Gilmer, Critics Hit Up 2 Courts to Block Obama Me-
thane Standards, E&E NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/04/17/stories/
1060079245 (discussing challenges to these Obama-era regulations). 
 98. See Stephen Lee, States Ask Judge to Restore Obama-Era Natural Gas Waste Rule, BLOOMBERG 
ENV’T (June 10, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/states-ask-
judge-to-restore-obama-era-natural-gas-waste-rule. According to the Wilderness Society, operators 
wasted at least 462 billion cubic feet of gas during President Obama’s administration. WILDERNESS 
SOC’Y, TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, THE STATE OF METHANE (2018). For New Mexico, with 
production almost doubling over the past several years, EDF reports about 1 million metric tons of 
emissions during 2018, with about three-fourths from Permian Basin. Mike Lee, Methane Emissions 
Double Previous Estimates—Study, E&E NEWS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2019/04/12/stories/1060154699. Production growth in 2018 led to significant increases in flaring—to 
levels not experienced for several years. See Mike Lee, Gas Glut Spurs Near-Record Flaring Across Shale 
States, E&E NEWS (May 8, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060292021; see also Jenny Madel, 
U.S. Flaring Spiked 48% Last Year – Study, E&E NEWS (June 14, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/2019/06/14/stories/1060574675. 
 99. See Madel, supra note 98 (noting how one report suggests that more natural gas is “flared in 
the Permian than is produced from the biggest offshore gas field in the Gulf of Mexico”); see also Carlos 
Anchondo, Gas Flaring Record Spiked CO2 Emissions in 2019—Report, E&E NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1062265397. 
 100. Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply 
Chain, 36 SCIENCE 186 (2018); see also Chelsea Harvey, Methane From Oil and Gas Sharply Underestimat-
ed—Study, E&E NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2020/02/20/stories/
1062396511; Carlos Anchondo, Gas Flare Blips Are World’s Biggest Methane Source—Report, E&E NEWS 
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061173321. For a report on venting and flaring with a 
unique focus on offshore activities, see BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, VENTING AND 
FLARING RESEARCH STUDY REPORT (Jan. 2017) (prepared by the Argonne Venting and Flaring Re-
search Team). 
 101. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF ANTHROPOGENIC 
METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). Some companies have worked with EDF and 
agreed on measures to monitor and reduce methane emissions. See Jenny Mandel, Methane Questions 
Leak to the Surface as Industry Gathers, E&E NEWS (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020954; John Fialka, More Gas is Leaking Than Previously Estimat-
ed-Study, E&E NEWS (June 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060086093/. 
_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020  12:21 PM 
Spring 2020] The Natural Gas Pipeline Wars 335 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration policies favor increased natural gas 
production, transportation, and export.102 And they do so as more than just a 
bridge fuel. Early in the Trump Administration, conversations by administration 
officials, including the President, typically coalesced around coal and oil rather 
than natural gas.103 Recapturing energy markets for coal became justified under the 
energy dominance umbrella. The Clean Power Plan, consequently, gave way to the 
proposed Affordable Clean Energy plan;104 the administration swiftly lifted the 
Obama federal coal leasing moratorium;105 it began removing environmental re-
quirements for coal plants under the CWA;106 it revised the Clean Air Act’s New 
Source Performance Standards to encourage investment in coal technologies other 
than high cost carbon capture and storage.107 The administration even unsuccess-
fully explored whether the Energy Department could entice FERC into deploying 
a relic provision in the Department of Energy Organization Act to promote coal 
 
 102. See, e.g., Jean Chemnick & Scott Waldman, Trump to Tout Natural Gas as Paris Climate 
Deadline Looms, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1061350671; 
Scott Waldman, Trump Outlines Environment Plan: More Fracking, E&E NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/10/24/stories/1061359091. 
 103. See Tom Randall, The Cheap Energy Revolution is Here, and Coal Won’t Cut It, BLOOMBERG 
ENV’T (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-26/the-cheap-energy-
revolution-is-here-and-coal-won-t-cut-it.  
 104. 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019). Chairman Neil Chatterjee submitted comments on how 
the proposed replacement of the Clean Power Plan, along with changes to the New Source Performance 
Standards, were welcome changes. Letter from Office of the Chairman Neil Chatterjee, FERC, to Act-
ing Administrator Wheeler, re: Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing 
Electric Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions to 
New Source Review Program, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-QAR-2017-0355, Oct. 31, 2018. 
 105. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3348, CONCERNING THE FEDERAL 
COAL MORATORIUM (Mar. 29, 2017). 
 106. Brady Dennis, Trump Administration Halts Obama-Era Rule Aimed at Curbing Toxic 
Wastewater from Coal Plants, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/04/13/trump-administration-halts-obama-era-rule-aimed-at-curbing-
toxic-wastewater-from-coal-plants/. Administrator Pruitt reportedly commented that “[t]he coal indus-
try was nearly devasted by years of regulatory overreach, [b]ut with new direction from President 
Trump, we are helping to turn things around for these [coal] miners and for many other hard working 
Americans.” Id. 
 107. 83 Fed. Reg. 65,424 (Dec. 20, 2018); News Release, EPA Proposes 111(b) Revisions to Ad-
vance Clean Energy Technology: Proposal Supports President Trump’s Energy Dominance Agenda, 
EPA (Dec. 6, 2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/epa-proposes-111b-revisions-advance-
clean-energy-technology.html (“The previous administration sought to discourage new coal develop-
ments by requiring the use of unproven carbon capture and storage technologies that turned out to be 
economically prohibitive and limited geographically. By revising the NSPS, EPA will protect the envi-
ronment while help to provide room for American energy production”). The administration, therefore, 
appears unlikely to limit GHG emissions from natural gas-fired power plants. Amena H. Saiyid, EPA 
Official Says No Need Now to Limit Carbon Dioxide at Gas Plants, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-official-says-no-need-now-to-
limit-carbon-dioxide-at-gas-plants. 
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and nuclear energy, by suggesting that the natural gas pipeline system is too sus-
ceptible to cyberattacks.108 
But coal-fired electric generation can no longer compete with natural gas or 
even renewable energy.109 With the Solar Investment Tax Credit assumed to ex-
pire, renewable generation capacity (primarily solar utility-scale and small-scale 
PV) is nevertheless expected to grow the most through 2050.110 Since 2017, the 
United States has been a net energy exporter due to abundant petroleum and gas 
production and reduced domestic oil consumption.111 The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) expects this trend to continue through the next several dec-
ades.112 Marketed U.S. natural gas production has grown from 22.4 million cubic 
feet in 2010 to 32.8 million in 2018,113 producing downward pressure on prices and 
a feedback loop incentivizing further coal to gas switching. This is projected to lead 
to “the largest production increase of all fossil fuels” through 2050.114 Shale gas 
production has been growing rapidly and is expected to continue over the next 20 
years, precipitating the need for increased pipeline capacity.115 When Bloomberg 
News reported in April 2019 on Chevron’s acquisition of Anadarko, it couched its 
piece as evidence that big oil ostensibly was transitioning to big gas.116 In 2018, 
natural gas usage by electric utilities surpassed coal as the dominant fuel, with the 
industry producing 35% of electric power from gas, 27% from coal, 19% from nu-
 
 108. See Blake Sobczak & Peter Behr, Pipeline Fears Anchor Trump’s Coal, Nuclear Bailout, E&E 
NEWS, June 4, 2018; Peter Behr et al., FERC’s Aid to DOE on Grid Threats: Too Far Or Just Right?, E&E 
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/08/14/stories/1060094027. 
 109. See generally TREVOR HOUSER, PETER MARSTERS, COLUMBIA/SIPA CTR. ON GLOBAL 
ENERGY POLICY, CAN COAL MAKE A COMEBACK? (Apr. 2017); BRETT JORDAN, IAN LANGE, & 
JOSHUA LINN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COAL DEMAND, MARKET FORCES, AND US COAL 
MINE CLOSURES (Apr. 2018). Legions of articles report on the decline of coal. See, e.g., Benjamin Stor-
row, Big, Young Power Plants Are Closing: Is It a New Trend?, E&E NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060053677; Dylan Brown, Production Costs, not Natural Gas, Closed 
More Mines—Study, E&E NEWS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060078177. 
 110. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 94-95 (Jan. 24, 2019) 
(hereinafter EIA 2019 OUTLOOK). 
 111. Id. at 14. 
 112. Id. 
 113. U.S Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm. 
 114. EIA 2019 OUTLOOK, supra note 110, at 69. 
 115. Mike Lee, “Shale Gas” Still Upending Industry After 10 Years-Report, E&E NEWS (June 21, 
2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/06/21/stories/1060085923. Reportedly, output of shale 
gas went from, in 2007, 51.7 billion cf/d, to 72.6 billion cf/d in 2017. Id. In 2018, experts expected that 
15% of the U.S.’s production would be exported. Naureen S. Malik, America’s Gas Exports Seen Jumping 
to 15 Percent of Output Next Year, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/americas-gas-exports-seen-jumping-
to-15-percent-of-output-next-year. 
 116. Christine Buurma & Alix Steel, Chevron-Anadarko Deal Shows Why Natural Gas is Big Oil’s 
Future, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 12, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-
and-energy/chevron-anadarko-deal-shows-why-natural-gas-is-big-oils-future. 
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clear power, and 17% from renewable energy.117 In the U.S., as in Europe, natural 
gas even recently surpassed coal as the leader in GHG emissions.118 EIA, conse-
quently, projects that natural gas will “[remain] the dominant fuel in the electric 
power sector through 2050.”119 Consumption of natural gas could also increase 
through 2050 (with marginal growth in the rate of increase in consumption after 
2020), although it is not expected to keep pace with increased production.120 And 
while a rise in LNG exports may demand additional infrastructure, EIA’s typical 
case projects that exports might stabilize by around 2030.121 
Almost immediately upon being inaugurated, President Trump issued several 
Executive Orders designed to promote, in part, energy infrastructure projects. Ex-
ecutive Order 13,766, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals of High Pri-
ority Infrastructure Projects announced the Administration’s policy of streamlining 
and expediting infrastructure projects, particularly those of a “high priority for the 
Nation.”122 On March 28, 2017, the White House issued Executive Order 13,783, 
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, directing that agencies review 
all their regulations, policies, guidance, and orders to explore where unnecessary 
obstacles, delays, or costs are hindering the “siting, permitting, production, utiliza-
tion, transmission, or delivery of energy resources.”123 Then in April 2017, the 
White House released Executive Order 13,795, Implementing an America-First Off-
shore Energy Strategy, announcing a priority for increasing domestic energy produc-
tion from federal lands and waters.124 In the summer of 2017, the President issued 
yet another order, this time on Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Envi-
ronmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure.125 In March and early 
April 2018, twelve agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding Implementing 
One Federal Decision Under Executive Order 13807, which provides an umbrella struc-
ture for agencies to explore how to achieve a two year permitting schedule for cov-
ered projects and specifically addresses agency engagement with the FERC.126 
 
 117. Power Sector Pushed Domestic U.S. Natural Gas Consumption to New Record in 2018, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.  (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38812.  
 118. Benjamin Storrow, Move Over, Coal: Gas Now Emits More CO2 in U.S., E&E NEWS (Dec. 9, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/12/09/stories/1061760587. 
 119. EIA 2019 OUTLOOK, supra note 110, at 92. 
 120. Id. at 34, 72. Although natural gas consumption increases marginally in the electric sector, it 
increases more significantly among industrial users—which includes for LNG export. Id. at 82. 
 121. Id. at 84-85. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13,766, 3 C.F.R. 261 (2018). 
 123. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2018). 
 124. Exec. Order No. 12,795, 3 C.F.R. 340 (2018). 
 125. Exec. Order No. 13,807, 3 C.F.R. 369 (2018). 
 126. Nick Sobczyk, Agencies Sign Agreement to Speed Permitting, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060078515; see generally Nick Sobczyk, ‘Discussion Draft’ Would Make 
Big Changes to NEPA, E&E NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060072251. 
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In spring 2019, the President issued two additional Executive Orders designed 
to mute states’ role in permitting energy projects and “boost oil and gas.”127 Issued 
on April 10, 2019, one Executive Order recaptured the President’s authority dele-
gated to the Department of State to issue permits for cross-border energy transpor-
tation projects, such as those presented by TransCanada’s Keystone XL oil pipe-
line.128 Ostensibly this move appears designed to shield the approval from judicial 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act and obviate compliance with 
NEPA.129 The other Executive Order describes the federal government’s duty to 
“promote efficient . . . processes” for permitting energy infrastructure projects, 
both by limiting states’ ability to veto or condition projects that might have an ef-
fect on water quality, and by directing the development of regulations and guid-
ance that would ensure a two year permitting schedule for new energy infrastruc-
ture.130 It also sparked controversy by further ordering the promulgation of 
regulations for transporting LNG by rail.131 As reporter Zach Coleman observed, 
“[t]he Trump administration’s plan to soften methane standards for the oil and gas 
industry is the first step in a larger effort to dismantle greenhouse gas rules for the 
booming sector.”132 
But what about the infrastructure necessary to support this boom, and 
FERC’s response? 
 
 127. Ariel Wittenberg & Kelsey Brugger, Trump’s Orders Target States’ Rights to Boost Oil and Gas, 
E&E NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060151873; see also Clifford 
Krauss, Trump Signs Orders to Speed up Oil and Gas Pipeline Construction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2019; Kel-
sey Brugger et al., What’s in Trump’s Energy Orders?, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060150115; Kelsey Brugger et al., Trump’s Energy Orders 
Spark Partisan and Legal Brawl, E&E NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1060153471. 
 128. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,491 (Apr. 15, 2019). The State Department did 
retain its authority to receive, process, and make recommendations on applications. Id. 
 129. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-37 (2018). 
 130. Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 15, 2019). 
 131. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Plan to Ship Natural Gas by Rail Stokes “Bomb Train” Fears, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-11/trump-
plan-to-ship-natural-gas-by-rail-stokes-bomb-train-fears. One environmental attorney feared a disaster 
waiting to happen, with trains carrying “extraordinarily flammable and dangerous substance through 
highly populated areas.” Id. The industry, however, counters how “[t]his form of liquefied natural gas is 
already being shipped all around the world all the time, including within the U.S., where it is driven in 
trucks to storage facilities.” Haley Zaremba, Environmentalists’ “Bomb Train” Concerns Are Overblown, 
OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 13, 2019), https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Environmentalists-Bomb-
Train-Concerns-Are-Overblown.html. In October 2019, the Administration released its draft proposal 
for promoting LNG by rail. Mike Lee, Trump Admin Unveils Rule Greenlighting LNG by Rail, E&E 
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/21/stories/1061333429. 
 132. Zack Coleman, Trump’s Move On Methane Begins Bigger Effort on Potent Gas, E&E NEWS 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/09/12/stories/1060096615; see also Bess Lev-
in, Trump’s “Insane” New Energy Policy Would Put Global Warming on Steroids, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 11, 
2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/09/trumps-insane-new-energy-policy-would-put-global-
warming-on-steroids. 
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III.  THE NEW PIPELINE WARS 
Several issues seem to populate most conversations about FERC and the De-
partment of Energy’s (DOE) approach toward promoting natural gas production. 
Some are merely technical, such as the increasing ability to coordinate natural gas 
infrastructure with electric power generation.133 Other issues, however, are more 
fundamental. The first is how to ensure that state and local communities can par-
ticipate in ensuring that environmental considerations are not relegated to after-
thoughts by FERC’s pipeline policies. The second is the escalating war between 
landowners and pipeline companies over the use of the existing condemnation pro-
cess. The third area is the public debate at the Commission and the D.C. Circuit 
over whether the Commission should consider, when issuing a certificate, the in-
cremental effect of increased GHG emissions from both downstream and upstream 
activities. The Commission even acknowledges aspects of these controversies, issu-
ing in April 2018 a notice of inquiry soliciting public input on not only these con-
tentious issues but an additional question surrounding the Commission’s pipeline 
certificate policy.134 
A.  State, Local, and Environmental Interests 
Long distance pipelines transport natural gas hundreds—perhaps thousands—
of miles, and in doing so naturally attract the attention of an array of local inter-
ests. Often this transported gas is destined for markets or consumers far removed 
from the pipeline route itself, leaving the pipeline certificate applicant with few 
natural allies. Occasionally, adversaries express concern with ruptures, water cross-
ings, endangered species impacts, effects on historic artifacts and Native American 
traditional cultural properties,135 and the increased overall production and con-
sumption of fossil fuels. 
At least since the early 1990s, safety concerns have acutely impacted local 
communities. Early in the morning on March 23, 1994, a “wall of flame” in Edi-
son, N.J. carried ash almost two miles when Texas Eastern Transmission Corp’s 
pipeline ruptured136 and left roughly 100 injured.137 New Jersey Senator Bill Brad-
 
 133. See MIT, FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 15-16 (2011) (discussing interdependence and noting how natural gas’ abundance can serve as 
a bridge with a “safe landing place in a low carbon future”). See infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 134. Certification of New Interstate National Gas Facilities, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Apr. 19, 2018). 
 135. The Dakota Access oil pipeline serves as an exemplar of the devastating potential effects on 
Native American communities and their cultural properties and resources—similar to the effect that 
developing the Canadian tar sands for the Keystone XL line would have on the First Nations of Cana-
da. See Troy A. Eid, Beyond Dakota Access Pipeline: Energy Development and the Imperative for Meaningful 
Tribal Consultation, 95 DEN. L. REV. 593, 599-602 (2018); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Environmental Justice 
and Tribal Sovereignty: Lessons from Standing Rock, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 667, 678-81 (2018). 
 136. Richard Pérez-Peňa, Huge Gas Pipeline Explosion Rocks Northeast New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/24/nyregion/huge-gas-pipeline-explosion-rocks-
northeast-new-jersey.html. 
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ley blamed a “breakdown in the regulatory and safety program,” eliciting calls for 
reform.138 Nevertheless, in Appalachia, landslides contributed to at least six explo-
sions in 2018; an explosion of a line north of Boston in 2018 devastated many 
homes and killed a resident; and in 2019, a gas pipeline ruptured in Kentucky, kill-
ing one person and injuring several others.139 Safety concerns continue to plague 
the industry, although in October 2019 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safe-
ty Administration (PHMSA) finally adopted a more expansive safety program.140 
The industry must now also confront an escalating chorus of local environ-
mental and land use concerns regarding the perils of new pipeline proposals. For 
example, proponents of the 678-mile Ruby Pipeline that would transport gas from 
Wyoming to Oregon embarked on an aggressive campaign to curry favor with af-
fected Wyoming counties.141 But project construction impacts associated with wa-
ter-crossings left the project vulnerable to a successful Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) challenge—albeit only after the project construction was completed!142 In 
the early 1990s, the 370 mile and $583 million Iroquois Pipeline was set to deliver 
 
 137. Robert Hanley, Edison Ready to Reopen Gas Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/12/nyregion/edison-ready-to-reopen-gas-pipeline.html. 
 138. Clifford J. Levy, Pipeline Blast Said to Show Flaws in Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/20/nyregion/pipeline-blast-said-to-show-flaws-in-rules.html. Two 
years later, Congress passed the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act. But 
even so, five years later, another explosion in Bellingham, Washington killed three people, and Con-
gress responded by strengthening the Act. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L ACADS. OF 
SCI., TRANSMISSION PIPELINES AND LAND USE: A RISK-INFORMED APPROACH—SPECIAL REPORT 
281 (2004). And yet 14 years later, with another devastating explosion in San Bruno, California that 
injured over 50 people and killed 7, Congressman Fred Upton (a prominent energy-focused Republi-
can) observed, “[p]ipelines are the arteries of our Nation’s energy infrastructure. Through our hundreds 
of thousands of miles of pipelines we transport the energy that fuels our economy, heats our homes, and 
powers our daily lives. Unfortunately, recent accidents have thrust this vital infrastructure into the 
headlines for the wrong reasons and perhaps highlighted the need for safety reassessments.” Pipeline 
Safety Oversight and Legis.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3, Serial No. 111-159 (2010) (statement of Rep. Upton, Member, H. Comm. 
Energy and Commerce). Since then, Congress has passed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, 
and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1904, as well as the Protecting Our Infra-
structure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-183, 130 Stat. 154. 
 139. See Mike Soraghan, Landslides, Explosions Spark Fear in Pipeline Country, E&E NEWS (June 4, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060472727 (discussing the Appalachian region topography and 
problems associated with constructing lines in that region). 
 140. Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: MAOP Reconfirmation, Expansion 
of Assessment Requirements, and Other Related Amendments, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,180 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to 
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191 and 192); Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 84 
Fed. Reg. 52,260 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195); Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Emer-
gency Order Procedures, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,015 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 190); see 
generally Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 155 (2018) (de-
tailing the history of the pipeline safety program). 
 141. See Emilene Ostlind, More Surprises Flow From Ruby Pipeline, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 
17, 2010), https://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/more-surprises-flow-from-ruby-pipeline. 
 142. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. BLM, 698 F.3d 1101, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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natural gas from the Canadian border to Long Island. Strange bedfellows opposed 
the pipeline: a group of landowners along the proposed path and energy producers 
favoring U.S. production.143 Notwithstanding the community opposition, the pro-
ject received a § 7 certificate from FERC in 1990 and a CWA permit from the 
Army Corps the following year.144 Several years after the pipeline became opera-
tional, information surfaced that the company violated environmental laws when 
constructing through wetlands and streams.145 
The NGA’s savings clause ensures the Act accommodates some of these con-
cerns. Although the NGA occupies the field and generally preempts many state 
and local requirements,146 it specifically disclaims preempting the CWA, the CAA, 
and the Coastal Zone Management Act.147 Local siting requirements are generally 
considered preempted by the NGA.148 In Dominion Resources, FERC reaffirmed its 
 
 143. Amy Brooke Baker, Opposition Clogs Gas Pipeline Plan, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 14, 1990), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1990-08-14-9003080013-story.html. 
 144. Permit Is Issued for Gas Pipeline to Long Island: 370-Mile Project to Run South from Canada, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991. The CWA § 404 program requires a permit for any discharge of dredged or 
fill material into jurisdictional waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2018). Typically, pipelines can rely 
upon a nationwide permit (NWP) and avoid a lengthier review, public participation, and permitting 
process. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344. States, however, can condition the availability of a NWP in the state 
by attaching special conditions. The Mountain Valley Pipeline attempted to use a NWP, but it became 
problematic when the Corps attempted to supplant West Virginia’s condition on the availability of the 
NWP in that state. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018) (also hold-
ing that the state could not waive its special condition). 
 145. See Joseph Berger, Pipeline Supervisors Charged with Harming Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/17/nyregion/pipeline-supervisors-charged-with-harming-
environment.html. 
 146. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988). 
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (2018). In 2005, Congress provided a mechanism for expedited judicial 
review for other required federal or state authorizations. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d); e.g., Dominion Transmis-
sion, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (remanding to require Maryland to process air 
permit). The court later explained Summers as avoiding what local requirements might be preempted by 
FERC’s order, noting on remand the only non-preempted requirement was a construction site plan. 
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 148. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 293; Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC v. Town of Wey-
mouth, 919 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2019) (ordinance preempted); Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 
723 F.3d 238, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2013); cf. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 
903 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2018) (suggesting court might explore application of state constitutional law); At-
lantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Nelson Cty Bd. of Supervisors, 2020 WL 1151073 (W.D. Va. Mar. 3, 
2020) (non-federally approved local regulatory authority preempted). The preemptive effect of the 
NGA is addressed as well in Fed. Power Comm’n v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964) and Ill. 
Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 315 U.S. 498 (1942). See supra note 72 and accompanying text 
(describing Energy Policy Act 2005 and LNG facilities); Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. 
FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Sound Energy Solutions, 107 FERC ¶ 61,263, 
para. 14 (2004) (discussing scope of jurisdiction and preemption). In 1981, DOE ensured that FERC 
would have authority over siting of LNG facilities, and in 1997 FERC issued § 3 regulations. Order 
No. 595, 62 Fed. Reg. 20,435 (June 4, 1997). In 1999, FERC issued NEPA filing regulations for LNG 
facilities. Order No. 603, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,582 (May 14, 1999), amended Order No. 603-A, 64 Fed. Reg. 
54,537 (Oct. 7, 1999), Order No. 609, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,392 (Oct. 25, 1999); see generally Russell Koois-
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practice of encouraging certificate holders to cooperate with local governments, but 
it did not expressly require cooperation as a condition of a certificate.149 FERC of-
ten avoids opining on whether a particular state program is preempted. Instead, 
the Commission generally avoids any direct conflict with states by issuing a condi-
tional certificate with a condition requiring, for instance, the receipt of any re-
quired environmental clearances before construction may proceed. This ploy ini-
tially seemed problematic and invited challenges,150 while today it is commonly 
accepted.151 
Section 401 of the CWA, in particular, remains a principal irritant for the 
pipeline industry, as some states are testing whether § 401 can become an avenue 
for examining and potentially halting fossil-fuel development. Section 401 applies 
to pipeline certificates when an activity “may result in any discharge into the navi-
gable waters.”152 States must be reasonably assured “that the activity will be con-
ducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards,”153 
and they may attach conditions to a certificate issuance.154 
 
tra, Note, How FERC Confuses the Role of State and Local Authorities in Regulating Certified Natural Gas 
Pipelines, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 59 (Winter 2015). 
 149. Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Reh’g, 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, para. 24 (2018); 
see also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 309 (2017) (“Any state or local per-
mits issued with respect to the jurisdictional facilities authorized herein must be consistent with the 
conditions of this certificate. We encourage cooperation between interstate pipelines and local authori-
ties. However, this does not mean that state and local agencies, through application of state or local 
laws, may prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of facilities approved by this 
Commission.”). 
 150. See Oregon v. FERC, 636 F.3d 1203, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (issue was being litigated but 
case dismissed when developer filed for bankruptcy); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. 
FERC 558 F.3d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (because certificate was conditional, and thus arguably no 
immediate injury, state lacked standing); see also Crown Landing LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2006). 
 151. E.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 62 (2018) (order on reh’g), 
aff’d Appalachian Voices v. FERC, 2019 WL 847199 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 19, 2019); see also Township of 
Bordentown v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234, 246 (3d Cir. 2018) (“FERC’s practice . . . complies with the plain 
language of the CWA.”); Town of Weymouth v. FERC, No. 17-1135 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2018) (un-
published) (conditional compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act); Del. Riverkeeper Net-
work v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 870 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2017) (reviewing CWA compliance); 
Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1319 (rejecting challenge to conditional certificate); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. 
McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 482 
F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2006). The D.C. Circuit also implicitly upheld this practice when denying an 
NGO standing in Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 152. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018); e.g., Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d 
746, 752-59 (2019); Sierra Club v. State Water Bd., 898 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 153. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (2019). 
 154. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). Since 2005, 
challenges to state action or inaction occur before a court of appeals. See Channing Jones, The Natural 
Gas Act, State Environmental Policy, and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Courts, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 163 (2016) (suggesting limiting aspects of federal review, although subsequent cases suggest other-
wise). 
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The pipeline industry first exhibited notable concern with the § 401 program 
during the proposed Iroquois Pipeline.155 That concern quickly dissipated but has 
recently returned. Both Washington and New York recently wielded their § 401 
authority in a manner some find troublesome.156 New York Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation’s (NYDEC) decision denying certification to the Consti-
tution Pipeline became a cause célèbre when the company failed to provide suffi-
cient information regarding alternative routes.157 New York also objected to 
FERC’s decision to treat the state as having waived its CWA § 401 authority to 
object to the Millennium Pipeline.158 The state delayed its review, concluding the 
applicant had not submitted a complete application.159 When it finally denied cer-
tification, it reasoned that FERC’s environmental analysis overlooked the effects 
from indirect downstream GHG emissions.160 Because the state received the appli-
cation over two years earlier on November 23, 2015, FERC concluded the state 
waived its § 401 certification. The Second Circuit agreed with FERC, construing 
the plain language of § 401 as being triggered upon “receipt” of a certification re-
quest.161 When, however, the NYDEC tried to persuade FERC that the Northern 
Access Pipeline needed to furnish additional information before the agency could 
ensure compliance with § 401, FERC informed the state it ran out of time.162 New 
York challenged that decision.163 
 
 155. I was personally involved in these issues as a practitioner during this period. See also Nat’l 
Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 156. See Ariel Wittenberg, EPA Curbs State Power to Deny Permits for Climate Concerns, E&E 
NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060510579. Environmental groups pressed 
Washington Department of Ecology to exercise § 401 authority and review the environmental and cli-
mate impacts of a proposed LNG terminal in Tacoma, Washington. Pamela King, Greens Sue to Block 
Wash. LNG Permit, E&E NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
stories/1060722199. 
 157. Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 
2017). FERC subsequently concluded the state waived its § 401 authority. Constitution Pipeline Co., 
168 FERC ¶ 61,129 (Aug. 28, 2019); cf. Niina H. Farah, Court Halts FERC, N.Y. Fight Over Constitution 
Pipeline, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2020/04/09/stories/
1062823895.  
 158. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018), earlier case 
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 159. 884 F.3d at 454. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 455-56. New York argued that “requiring state agencies to act on a request within one 
year will force it to render premature decisions. Among other harms . . . such a requirement may un-
dermine public notice and comment, impede a state from working with the applicant to refile in accord-
ance with its requirements, and prompt applicants to flood the courts of appeal.” Id. at 456. 
 162. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 167 FERC ¶ 61,007 (2019). The Second Circuit already va-
cated and remanded the state certification decision back to the agency. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 
N.Y. State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 761 Fed. App’x 68 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2019). FERC reaffirmed 
its approach toward waiver when declaring that New York waived its ability to issue or deny certifica-
tion for the Constitution Pipeline, relying on Hoopa Valley Tribe. Constitution Pipeline Co., 168 FERC 
¶ 61,129 (Aug. 28, 2019). The Supreme Court rejected a request to decide whether states waive their 
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Some interested observers suggest that states are “abusing” their CWA au-
thority.164 According to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America 
(INGAA), the traditional federal/state balance “has been disrupted and some states 
have viewed Section 401 as a means of determining which interstate pipeline pro-
jects are in the public interest and which are not.”165 That concern may be some-
what exaggerated, as even the controversial Atlantic Coast Pipeline received a § 
401 certification that survived judicial review.166 To be sure, the fate of Northern 
Access is still uncertain, and the Manhattan Institute suggests that blocking North-
ern Access will contribute to future gas shortages in the region.167 A senior Repub-
lican Senator nevertheless floated legislative language designed to arrest some of 
these state efforts.168 The National Conference of State Legislatures, however, ex-
pressed concern that such proposals thwart the CWA’s model for dual federal-
 
right to certification if they cooperate with an applicant and allow the applicant the opportunity to 
withdraw and resubmit a certification request. Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, (Dec. 9, 2019) (No. 19-257). 
 163. See Pamela King, N.Y. Challenges FERC Approval of Northern Access, E&E NEWS (May 31, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060435951; see also Ryan Collins, New York Denies  
Gas Pipe Again as Trump Eyes Permit Speedup, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/new-york-denies-gas-pipe-again-as-
trump-eyes-permit-speedup. 
 164. E.g., Daren Bakst, Commentary, States Abusing Federal Provision to Block Critical Projects, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/daren-bakst/states-abusing-
federal-provision-block-critical-projects. In November 2019, Oklahoma’s Governor testified at a Senate 
hearing complaining how some states were abusing their authority. Water Quality Certification Reform 
Hearing on S. 1087 Before the Senate Env’t & Public Works Comm., 116th Cong. 1 (Nov. 19, 2019) 
(statement of Hon. J. Kevin Stitt, Governor, Oklahoma). 
 165. Press Release, INGAA, INGAA Statement on EPA Clean Water 401 Guidance (June 7, 
2019) (available at https://www.ingaa.org/News/PressReleases/36506.aspx.). In April 2018, the natural 
gas industry wrote President Trump requesting federal guidance that would limit state authority. See 
Letter from the Nat. Gas Council, to President Donald J. Trump (Apr. 10, 2018) (available at 
https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34275&source=generalSearch.). Other states are exploring the 
scope of their authority: a Maryland legislator, for instance, asked their state attorney general to assess 
the constitutionality of proposed changes to that state’s water quality certification program for pipe-
lines. Letter from Attorney General of Maryland, to Hon. Charles J. Otto (Feb. 18, 2019) (on file with 
author); see generally Mike Lee, Bill to Slow Pipeline Permitting Gains Speed in Md., E&E NEWS (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/03/08/stories/1060123473 (reporting on a Maryland 
bill that will promote public access for the permitting process). 
 166. Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 167. ROBERT BRYCE, MANHATTAN INST., OUT OF GAS: NEW YORK’S BLOCKED PIPELINES 
WILL HURT NORTHEAST CONSUMERS (June 25, 2019).  
 168. See Barrasso Reintroduces Legislation to Improve Water Quality Certifications, Press Releases, U.S. 
SENATE COMM, ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.epw.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2019/4/barrasso-reintroduces-legislation-to-improve-water-quality-certifications. An 
interesting student note suggests legislation that would afford states the ability to exercise their authori-
ty upon performing a cost/benefit analysis. Jason Bressler, Note, Blocking Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines: 
How to Curb Climate Change While Strengthening the Nation’s Energy System, 44 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137 
(2019). 
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ism.169 President Trump’s April 2019 Executive Order 13,868 directed that EPA 
issue new guidance for state compliance with § 401.170 EPA responded on June 7, 
2019,171 principally clarifying that states must act within the established or extend-
ed (between the agency and the state) timeframe or waive their § 401 authority, 
and that § 401 and the state conditioning authority under § 401(d) is limited to wa-
ter quality concerns.172 Several state attorneys general responded by attacking 
EPA’s guidance and asking for its rescission or revision, informing the agency they 
will follow prior binding requirements for the certification process.173 EPA then 
followed its guidance with proposed regulations.174 While this feud appears likely 
to continue throughout this administration, it seems less likely than the challenge 
by landowners to affect natural gas policymaking too much. 
B.  The Pipeline Wars with Landowners 
An industry cherished feature of the NGA is that, once a natural gas company 
receives a § 7 certificate of public convenience and necessity, it secures a federal 
right to exercise eminent domain.175 Typically, eminent domain authority, or the 
authority to condemn private property upon payment of just compensation, can be 
exercised only by governmental entities or by those with delegated authority from 
a governmental authority that enjoys eminent domain power under the Federal or 
a state constitution. Electric transmission line developers, therefore, lack federal 
eminent domain authority—a principal problem according to many in that indus-
try. But Congress granted eminent domain authority to private entities for the 
 
 169. See William T. Pound, Letter to the Honorable Mitch McConnell RE: Protecting States’ 
Authorities Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Oct. 3, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/standcomm/scnri/CWA_401_CongressFINAL.pdf. 
 170. Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 15, 2019). 
 171. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES, STATES 
AND AUTHORIZED TRIBES (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/documents/
cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf [hereinafter CWA SECTION 401 GUIDANCE]. EPA issued proposed 
regulations on August 8, 2019. Updating Regulations on Water Quality, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,080 (proposed 
Aug. 22, 2019). 
 172. Id. Absent regulatory changes, one industry lawyer suggested the guidance will not likely 
chill state efforts. See David Schultz, EPA Guidance May Not Keep States from Blocking Pipelines, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 11, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/us-law-week/epa-
guidance-may-not-keep-states-from-blocking-pipelines?context=article-related. 
 173. Attorneys General of California, Connecticut, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Comment Letter on Clean Water Act Section 
401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States, and Authorized Tribes (July 25, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/
system/files/attachments/press-docs/State%20AG%20Comments%20on%20Section%20401%20
Guidance-FINAL%2019-0725.pdf. 
 174. CWA SECTION 401 GUIDANCE, supra note 171; Updating Regulations on Water Quality, 84 
Fed. Reg. 44,080.   
 175. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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construction of interstate pipelines, if the interstate pipeline receives a Certificate 
of Public and Convenience and Necessity from FERC.176 
For many interstate natural gas companies, eminent domain authority is a 
backstop. Companies generally prefer to negotiate with landowners and avoid emi-
nent domain proceedings.177 As one of the three prerequisites for exercising emi-
nent domain authority, the company must, after all, demonstrate that it attempted 
to negotiate with the landowner.178 Kinder Morgan, one of the largest interstate 
pipeline companies, defends the right of eminent domain as a necessary tool for 
preventing any single landowner from having the ability to veto a project or hold a 
project hostage.179 The company’s approach is to secure rights-of-way “on a volun-
 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); see supra note 67. For intrastate pipelines or electric transmission 
developers, states vary on how they approach affording companies eminent domain authority. And of-
ten the use of state eminent domain authority precipitates dialogues about how far such authority 
should extend. See Travis Bubenik, New Push for Eminent Domain Reform Expected at Texas Legislature, 
KUT 90.5-NPR (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.kut.org/post/new-push-eminent-domain-reform-expected-
texas-legislature.  
 177. In July 2018, the member companies of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, 
the industry’s principal trade association, adopted a resolution that they would negotiate in good faith 
with landowners and exercise their right to eminent domain “only . . . as a means of last resort.” 
INTERSTATE NAT. GAS ASS’N OF AM., COMMITMENTS TO LANDOWNERS (2018). Also, “[t]he Com-
mission has long expressed a preference for minimizing the need for certificate holders to resort to emi-
nent domain to acquire land for a given project.” Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 516 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
 178. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018). The other two are that the value exceeds $3,000 and that it 
holds a § 7 certificate. Id. A demonstration of good faith negotiations, however, may not be necessary. 
See Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. Decoulos, 146 Fed. App’x 495, 498 (1st Cir. 2005) (not 
requiring demonstration of good faith); Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Certain Permanent & Temp. 
Easements, 777 F. Supp.2d 475, 482 (W.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d 552 Fed. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Booth, 2016 WL 7439348, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016) (ex-
amining the issue and concluding that majority of modern courts reject inquiry into good faith); Kansas 
Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 1253, 1256 (D. Kan. 2002) (not 
required to show good faith); Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 529.42 Acres of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 971, 
973-4 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[The Court is] unaware of any case in which condemnation has been denied or 
even delayed because of an alleged failure to engage in good faith negotiations.”). But see Transcon. Gas 
Pipe Line Corp. v. 118 Acres of Land, 745 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (E.D. La. 1990) (earlier case involving 
gas storage implicitly suggesting applying state law imposing a requirement for good faith negotiation, 
although not finding a good faith violation). Some states require good faith negotiations during eminent 
domain proceedings, and the NGA provides “[t]he practice and procedure in any action or proceeding 
for [the] purpose [of exercising eminent domain] . . . shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice 
and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated.” 
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 arguably negates this language, at least in 
some circuits. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL 6584893 *16 (D.N.J., Dec. 14, 2018); see also 
Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725 (3d Cir. 2018), earlier 
op. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 2.59 Acres, 709 Fed. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 
2017). FERC too interprets the NGA as not requiring good faith negotiations. Mountain Valley Pipe-
line, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018) (order on reh’g). A showing of diligence in searching for landowners 
with partial interests may be necessary when a company seeks a default judgment against absentee land-
owners. E.g., Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. 2.58 Acres, 2020 WL 291839 (W.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2020). 
 179. See KINDER MORGAN, WHITE PAPER: EMINENT DOMAIN 3 (2015).  
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tary basis.”180 To be sure, the threat of condemnation serves as a powerful incen-
tive for landowners to negotiate. In a condemnation proceeding, the landowner is 
entitled to receive only the fair market value for the pipeline easement across the 
property.181 During the negotiation process with the pipeline company, therefore, a 
landowner must gamble on whether the risk of proceeding in court outweighs an 
offer by the company. According to some private property right advocates, that 
negotiation process generally lacks the usual trimmings of an equal bargaining pro-
cess, often affording the landowner only limited ability to secure favorable terms 
and conditions.182 
If the negotiation process fails, the condemnation proceeding is limited to ad-
judicating the fair market value of the easement. The pipeline company typically 
initiates an eminent domain proceeding in federal district court, although a state 
forum is available.183 Generally, federal courts disclaim any authority to examine 
the terms and conditions of the right-of-way, or the necessity for the right-of-away 
across that particular landowner’s property.184 Those issues, instead, are reserved 
exclusively to FERC’s jurisdiction and subsequent review by the appropriate Unit-
ed States Court of Appeal.185 Once the company receives its certificate, therefore, 
it enjoys the right “to obtain automatically the necessary right of way through emi-
nent domain, with the only issue being the compensation the landowner defendant 
will receive in return for the easement.”186 The FERC § 7 proceeding, consequent-
ly, is where a landowner can raise any concerns about the potential easement across 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. See e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (Sept. 11, 
2019) (discussing evidence for fair market value); Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 1.81 Acres of Land, 2019 
WL 4007924 (W.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2019) (same). While it should be apparent that federal principles for 
just compensation apply, the Third Circuit oddly suggested it would incorporate state law as the federal 
standard—albeit suggesting that federal law is a floor and state law can add damages for consideration. 
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019). Cf. UGI 
Sunbury LLC v. Permanent Easement for 1,7575 Acres, 949 F.3d (3d Cir. 2020) (applying FRE 702 
and Daubert standard to exclude stigma damages from just compensation). 
 182. See Jonathan Wood, Pipelines v. Property Rights, PERC (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.perc.org/2017/11/07/pipelines-v-property-rights/.  
 183. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. A state forum may not be available for a pipeline 
with a conditional certificate and no § 401 certification. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler, 
167 A.D.3d 128, 136-37 (S.C. App. D. 2018) (company attempted to use state instance vesting process 
before obtaining the § 401 certification—which shortly thereafter was denied, and which certification 
was a condition to the FERC certificate—although FERC later said the state waived its § 401 authori-
ty). 
 184. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 255, 264 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 185. Id.; see also Kan. Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 1253, 
1256 (D. Kan. 2002). In N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2011 WL 2118642, at *3 (D. 
Kan. May 27, 2011), the court further confirmed that landowners may not raise state claims through a 
counterclaim in an NGA eminent domain proceeding. If, moreover, a landowner fails to intervene and 
raise objections during the FERC proceeding, they are precluded from seeking judicial review. 
 186. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less, 768 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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its property. And when the natural gas company files its § 7 application, the land-
owner notification process is designed to ensure that landowners become aware of 
what is down the road.187 
Pipeline opponents and frustrated landowners are waging battles against this 
process.188 Even FERC’s Notice of Inquiry (NOI) invited commentary as part of 
this conversation.189 Generally, critics decry the process as denying landowners 
their due process rights and guarantee against having property taken for a public 
use without just compensation. The libertarian Niskanen Center, for instance, ar-
gues that FERC’s process for affording notice to landowners is inadequate, too 
short, and so confusing that it deprives property owners of procedural due pro-
cess.190 Its argument proceeds from the correct proposition that objections to a 
pipeline must be adjudicated in the FERC process, and only intervenors in the 
agency’s process can challenge a FERC decision in a petition for judicial review.191 
It then suggests that inadequate notice and impediments to intervention impose 
significant and unfair hurdles for many affected landowners.192 The notice problem 
is exemplified, it adds, for pipelines like the controversial Mountain Valley Pipe-
line (MVP) that cross areas where it is likely the landowners are uneducated and 
less able to appreciate the implications of any notice.193 Finally, Niskanen posits 
that FERC’s use of tolling orders and conditional certificates violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Tolling orders might delay a landowner’s day in court for six months 
or more; conditional certificates might allow taking a property interest even 
 
 187. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.6(a)(2), (3) (2019), 157.6(d) (landowner notification); 18 C.F.R. 
§ 157.7 (2019) (abbreviated filing under 18 C.F.R. § 385.2011, re electronic media); 18 C.F.R. § 157.21 
(2019) (pre-filing requirements, including stakeholder involvement); 18 C.F.R. § 380.15 (2019) (siting 
and maintenance requirements); FERC, DOE, Revisions to Landowner Notification and Blanket Cer-
tificate Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,939 (Oct. 23, 2007); FERC, BLANKET CERTIFICATE PROGRAM: 
NOTICE TO LANDOWNERS (2007); see also FERC, DOE, Landowner Notification, Expanded Categori-
cal Exclusions, and Other Environmental Filing Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,374, 57,377 (Oct. 25, 
1999) (“The Commission’s intent behind the landowner notification requirement was that the applicant 
should make a good faith effort to serve all affected landowners.”). FERC’s 2014 Order No. 790 also 
included a written landowner notification requirement before an interstate natural gas pipeline could 
conduct minor maintenance and replacement activities. 
 188. Robert McNamara & David Bookbinder, Pipeline Builders Abuse Eminent Domain, WALL ST. 
J. (July 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pipeline-builders-abuse-eminent-domain-1532039318; 
see also Ilya Somin, The Growing Battle Over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take Property for Pipelines, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/06/07/the-growing-battle-over-the-use-of-eminent-domain-to-take-property-for-pipelines/. 
 189. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 190. Niskanen Ctr., Comments in Response to FERC’s Notice of Inquiry 83 Fed. Reg. 18,020, 
Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. For instance, the Center suggests that notices to landowners fail to adequately convey 
that, unless they intervene in the FERC proceeding, they will be unable to challenge any FERC deci-
sion. Id. at 6. 
 193. Id. at 19. 
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though the pipeline may ultimately lack eminent domain authority should it fail to 
satisfy its certificate conditions.194 
These and similar concerns are now surfacing as litigants hope to enlist the aid 
of the judiciary in their quest to alter interstate pipelines’ use of eminent domain 
authority. The MVP exemplifies this effort. The MVP is a 42-inch roughly 300-
mile line that would carry natural gas from West Virginia to southern Virginia.195 
Landowners along the route participated in the FERC process and objected, fear-
ing it would adversely affect the environment and pose several safety hazards.196 In 
response, FERC noted MVP’s statement that it would engage in good faith efforts 
to negotiate with landowners before exercising any eminent domain authority, and 
further that the company entertained several changes to accommodate route con-
cerns.197 It then reiterated that the NGA affords eminent domain authority, and 
the Commission’s sole responsibility is merely to determine whether the pipeline is 
entitled to a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity under its policy.198 
The Commission issued its typical conditional certificate, requiring subse-
quent receipt of required environmental clearances.199 With that certificate in 
hand, MVP then initiated condemnation proceedings in order to secure immediate 
access to the properties.200 FERC specifically allows this, reasoning that its condi-
tional certificate “prohibits parties from commencing construction, not engaging in 
eminent domain proceedings, prior to obtaining all permits and satisfying all envi-
ronmental conditions.”201 Many of the landowners allegedly “first learned they had 
been sued—and that MVP was seeking to seize part of their land immediately—
when they discovered a thick packet with two filings duct-taped to their doors.”202 
By allowing the company to proceed with filing a preliminary injunction authoriz-
ing immediate access to the property, even before all the environmental clearances 
had been secured, the landowners claimed that MVP could “bulldoze large swaths 
 
 194. Id. at 23-32. 
 195. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 24 (2017) (MVP Order), on 
rehearing Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 60 (2017). The Commission 
added its certificate decision could suffice as a “public use” determination for purposes of allowing fed-
eral eminent domain authority under the Constitution. Id. para. 61. The Commission again expressed 
this view on rehearing. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, paras. 34-39 (2018). 
 199. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC 61,043, at 105, app. C (2017) (requiring compli-
ance with Appendix C environmental conditions and specifically paragraph 9). 
 200. E.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353 
(4th Cir. 2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (W.D. Va. 
Sept. 11, 2019) (noting that condemnation issued on March 8, 2018); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 
1.81 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4007924 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2019). 
 201. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 72.  
 202. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, No. 19-54 
(U.S. July 3, 2019).  
_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020  12:21 PM 
350 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 9:2 
 
of land along the pipeline’s route . . . [and] cut down millions of trees, dig out 
hillsides, and destroy other property in carving a 125-foot-wide clear-cut swath 
through previously pristine countryside.”203 
Landowners also targeted the practice of allowing a pipeline to take property 
almost immediately upon the filing of a condemnation proceeding. The Declara-
tion of Taking Act (DTA)204 allows condemning parties the ability to “quick take” 
properties upon the filing of a declaration of taking. A declaration filing vests the 
property interest with the condemning party.205 Even though the DTA does not 
apply to proceedings by pipeline companies acting under the authority of the 
NGA, courts in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have allowed the immediate 
possession of property even “without the benefit of summary judgment.”206 In lieu 
of the DTA, these courts allow an interstate pipeline company to file a motion for 
preliminary injunction under FRCPs 71.1 and 65, ostensibly affording a court suf-
ficient information about whether the company enjoys § 7(h) authority. The Third 
Circuit rejected an argument that, because Congress in the NGA omitted any pro-
vision for a quick take of property, this practice violates separation of powers.207 
This is how the process unfolded with the MVP.208 A certiorari petition asking the 
Court to resolve whether a court may “issue a preliminary injunction granting im-
mediate possession of property to a pipeline company in a condemnation proceed-
ing under the [NGA]” was recently denied.209 
 
 203. Id. at 8-9. Financial arrangements require tight pipeline construction schedules, and this 
pressure may have led to MVP’s poor environmental compliance. See Mike Lee, Va. Officials Freeze 
Work on Mountain Valley, E&E NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2019/08/05/stories/1060851223. 
 204. 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2018). 
 205. Id. 
 206. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL 6584893, at *14 (D.N.J., Dec. 14, 2018); see Moun-
tain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Western Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2019); 
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 18-2235, 757 Fed. App’x 489 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 
2018) (allowing use of preliminary injunction); see also Dominion Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 0.11 
Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4781872 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2019) (granting preliminary injunction and 
immediate possession). 
 207. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements, 907 F.3d 725 (3d Cir. 2018) (Atlan-
tic Sunrise Project); cf. East Tenn. Natural Gas, LLC v. 1.28 Acres in Smyth County, VA, 2006 WL 
1133874 (W.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2006) (allowing immediate possession through the court’s equitable power 
of issuing preliminary injunction, citing East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 208. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Easements to Construct, Operate, and Maintain, 2018 
WL 648376 (W.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2018) (granting preliminary injunction and immediate possession but 
conditioned upon company providing sufficient evidence of adequate security for compensation); see 
also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (W.D. Va. Sept. 11, 
2019). 
 209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, (July 3, 
2019) (No. 19-54), cert. denied (Oct. 7, 2019). 
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Whether in the MVP proceeding or subsequently, it seems likely that this 
practice will trigger heightened scrutiny.210 When, for instance, Transcontinental 
Gas Pipe Line Company (Transco) received its certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise 
Project, landowners sought rehearing from FERC.211 Even before the Commission 
could resolve the rehearing request, Transco not only obtained its preliminary in-
junction allowing condemnation, but also received a construction order from 
FERC that allowed construction activities. The company “broke ground that same 
day.”212 The landowners lost their due process claim, but Judge Millett neverthe-
less described this process as “Kafkaesque.”213 Bound by precedent, she lamented, 
“Circuit precedent gave the Commission the tools it has used to create this admin-
istrative quagmire for those who seek to challenge its decisions. In my view, we 
should put an end to it.”214 She further stated that this entire process “runs rough-
shod over basic principles of fair process.”215 In their successful request for rehear-
ing, petitioners urged that the court revisit its precedent in light of the current 
practice, to avoid fostering what it argued is a Fifth Amendment violation.216 
 
 210. An attempt to challenge the eminent domain process in district court failed. Berkley v. 
Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C., 896 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 941 (2019). 
Landowners secured a partial victory, however, when the D.C. Circuit told FERC it had to better ex-
plain why precedent agreements for the Nexus pipeline to ship a considerable amount of gas outside the 
U.S. was in the public interest. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2019); cf. Town 
of Weymouth v. FERC, No. 17-1135, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2018) (unpublished) (FTA countries 
can serve public interest). 
 211. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co., 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (order on reh’g). 
 212. Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 932 F.3d 940, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 
 213. Id. at 948 (Millett, J., concurring). 
 214. Id. at 950. Existing precedent merely upheld the use of tolling orders. Id. at 951 (citing Cali-
fornia Co. v. FPC, 411 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam)). 
 215. Id. Judge Millett’s opinion provides a good analysis of the problems attendant with the 
Commission’s use of tolling orders, orders that do not automatically stay the Commission’s underlying 
decision and allow the Commission to avoid resolving a rehearing request before a company can con-
demn land and receive a construction order. Nearly a year passed from the date of the Commission’s 
certificate order for the Nexus pipeline and its rehearing order, enough time for the pipeline to have 
completed its condemnation proceeding. City of Oberlin, 937 F.3d at 603. Similarly, the fight over Pen-
nEast Pipeline’s ability to condemn state lands, In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 
2019), occurred before the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the challenge to FERC’s certificate or-
der. PennEast also asked the Court to review the decision. Niina H. Farah, PennEast Asks Supreme Court 
to Review Stand Land Grabs, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2020/02/25/stories/1062439925; see also Niina H. Farah, Groups: Gas Pipeline Ruling Gives States Too 
Much Power, E&E NEWS (Mar. 25, 2020) (describing amicus filings), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1062692321.  
 216. On December 5, 2019, the D.C. Circuit vacated its earlier opinion and ordered rehearing en 
banc, scheduled for March 2020. Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 943 F.3d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(per curiam). 
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C.  FERC, NEPA, and Climate Change 
The third principal controversy surrounds FERC’s role in the climate change 
debate. FERC historically has struggled with how to address GHG emissions in its 
decisions. The NGA requires the agency to examine the “public interest,” arguably 
embracing the need to explore whether a project’s ostensible contribution toward 
GHG emissions warrants consideration in FERC’s balancing of the pros and cons 
of a proposed project.217 NEPA requires that the Commission examine whether a 
project is a major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human 
environment. In doing so it directs, in part, that FERC explore the direct, indirect, 
and cumulative effects of its decisions218—again, arguably embracing the need to 
explore whether a project’s ostensible contribution toward GHG emissions war-
rants exploration. The State Department’s fiasco with the Keystone XL pipeline 
manifested the urgency of appreciating the GHG effects associated with approving 
new oil and gas pipelines. When the Council on Environmental Quality prepared 
its general NEPA guidance for assessing GHG emissions, some commentators be-
lieved it would “encourage FERC to take a more Keystone-like approach to their 
reviews, [and] to ask applicants to look upstream and downstream” to address 
GHG emissions associated with new oil and gas wells, and to address GHG emis-
sions produced downstream when the natural gas or oil is burned.219 
The current Republicans on the Commission, though, openly disavow the 
need to explore how their decisions could affect climate change. FERC Chairman 
Neil Chatterjee, for instance, commented to then EPA Acting Administrator 
Wheeler that the Clean Power Plan arguably infringed on FERC’s jurisdiction, 
and that FERC lacks authority to address climate change under the NGA.220 
Chairman Chatterjee’s perspective, joined by Republican Commissioner Bernard 
McNamee, has generated a public feud within the Commission about the agency’s 
approach to analyzing GHG emissions during its pipeline and LNG proceedings—
whether under NGA § 7 or NEPA.221 
 
 217. FERC’s process seemingly tilts the balance away from any holistic analysis of a project’s 
pros and cons, because the Commission may preliminarily pre-determine a project’s benefits outweigh 
its costs even before it has completed an EIS. See Fuel Safe Wash. v. FERC, 389 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 
2004) (making its public benefits determination less than a month after public hearings on the draft 
EIS). 
 218. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8 (2019). 
 219. Hannah Northey, White House NEPA Guidance Could Trigger Change at FERC, E&E NEWS 
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010881. 
 220. Letter from Office of the Chairman Neil Chatterjee, FERC, to Acting Administrator 
Wheeler, re Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Generating 
Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review 
Program, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-QAR-2017-0355, Oct. 31, 2018. 
 221. See Rod Kuckro, McNamee, Glick Clash Over Climate, E&E NEWS (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/19/stories/1060757919. 
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Chairman Chatterjee announced the Commission’s latest policy for addressing 
GHG emissions in a 2018 decision involving the construction and upgrading of 
compression facilities in New York to accommodate increased natural gas.222 Re-
sponding to questions about the sufficiency of the project’s EA or the Commis-
sion’s § 7 obligations, FERC concluded that its public interest review under the 
NGA does not include an inquiry into climate change impacts. Next, the Commis-
sion reasoned that, because it cannot control either the upstream production of 
natural gas or its corresponding downstream consumption, NEPA does not require 
examining the effects of such production and consumption. Ostego argued that 
FERC should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and that 
the Commission had to examine the upstream and downstream impacts of the pro-
ject.223 Next, it claimed “that unspecified emerging research regarding the project’s 
impacts upon climate change and health and safety of residents are particularly 
controversial and require the preparation of an EIS.”224 FERC dispatched this 
claim rather quickly, suggesting that Ostego conflated controversy over the project 
with controversy over the impacts.225 It also disagreed with Ostego that a modifica-
tion of an existing facility allowed the Commission to revisit the environmental 
impacts of the existing facility, noting its examination is “limited to the company’s 
proposal.”226 
On upstream and downstream effects, Ostego challenged the Commission’s 
failure to examine cumulative effects from increased GHG emissions.227 Notably, 
no party suggested that upstream or downstream impacts could be examined as in-
direct effects, and the Commission indicated it could not sufficiently predict any 
indirect upstream or downstream effects.228 The Commission admitted it had for a 
time examined both production and downstream effects. It added, though, that 
such an analysis was unnecessary under NEPA229 and too generic and specula-
 
 222. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2018) (order denying rehearing); see also 
155 FERC ¶ 61,106 (Apr. 28, 2016) (decided prior to Chatterjee being appointed as a commissioner).  
 223. 163 FERC paras. 61-3; see also Dominion Transmission, Inc., 155 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2016) 
(order issuing certificate). 
 224. Id. para. 18. 
 225. Id. paras. 18-19. 
 226. Id. para. 28. 
 227. See generally Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, paras. 30-44 (2018). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Of course, “[c]ourts have found that combustion emissions are an indirect effect of an agen-
cy’s decision to extract . . . natural resources,” Wilderness Workshop v. BLM., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 
1155 (D. Colo. 2018), and little difference exists between a decision to allow leasing of natural gas and a 
decision to approve the ability to transport that gas. See also Wildearth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. 
Supp. 3d 41, 66-68 (D.D.C. 2019). One difficulty is distinguishing in a GHG analysis between indirect 
and cumulative effects. See Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (D. Colo. 
2019); San Juan Citizens All. v. BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018). 
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tive.230 It then went further and rejected examining cumulative effects of increased 
GHG emissions unless those effects are “reasonably foreseeable.”231 In a wordy 
analysis, crabbed by FERC’s narrow focus on a defined geographic area, the Com-
mission indicated it lacked sufficient information to examine either production-
related or downstream impacts. “[I]f,” the Commission reasoned, it “does not have 
meaningful information about future power plants, storage facilities, or distribu-
tion networks, within the geographic scope of a project-affected resource, then 
these impacts are not reasonably foreseeable for inclusion in the cumulative im-
pacts analysis.”232 On rehearing, the Commission reiterated it would no longer en-
gage in an upstream and downstream analysis, as it had previously, under the ru-
bric of providing at least upper-bound estimates of what those impacts might be.233 
Commissioners LaFleur and Glick registered strong objections.234 Both ex-
pressed dismay at the Commission’s departure from its recent practice, particularly 
so soon after it issued its pipeline certificate policy notice of inquiry. And both 
questioned the Commission’s reasoning that indirect downstream impacts are not 
reasonably foreseeable and causally related to the Commission’s decisions. Com-
missioner Glick forcefully chastised the Commission for violating NEPA and the 
NGA’s public interest standard, as well as attempting to shield itself from examin-
ing indirect effects by not asking pipeline applicants for the relevant infor-
mation.235 
Other recent orders follow this typical pattern: abdication by the Commis-
sion’s Republican members and objections by their Democratic colleagues.236 Most 
 
 230. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, para. 41 (2018); cf. Wildearth Guardians 
v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the agency’s failure to examine GHG emissions be-
cause of alleged availability of substitute coal). 
 231. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, paras. 30-44 (2018). 
 232. Id. para. 34. In paragraphs 37 through 42 of its Order, the Commission justified limiting the 
geographic scope of its analysis, reasoning that, for upstream effects, “the magnitude of analysis re-
quested by Otsego bears no relationship to the limited magnitude of the New Market Project’s 65.4 
acres for operation of the facilities” and the Commission lacks sufficient “information regarding the 
number, location, and timing of wells, roads, gathering lines, and other appurtenant facilities, as well as 
details about production methods.” And for downstream effects, “nothing in the record . . . identifies 
any specific end use or new incremental load downstream of the New Market Project, much less an end 
use or new incremental load within the geographic area of where the impacts from the New Market 
Project will be felt.” Id. paras. 37-39. 
 233. Id. paras. 55-70. The Commission, however, indicated that it would “continue to analyze 
upstream and downstream environmental effects when those effects are sufficiently causally connected 
to and are reasonably foreseeable effects of the proposed action, as contemplated by CEQ’s regula-
tions.” Id. para. 44.  
 234. 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 235. Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 236. The Commission’s MVP Order also discussed analyzing GHG emissions. Mountain Valley 
Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 287-296 (2017). It rejected using a social cost of carbon for 
individual pipeline review, id. para. 296, which it did in its DTE Order as well. DTE Midstream Appa-
lachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, paras. 72-82 (2018). The environmental analysis in the DTE Order 
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vocal remains Commissioner Glick, who registers objections to the Commission’s 
failure to consider GHG emissions under both the NGA and NEPA.237 In re-
sponse, Commissioner McNamee claims the Commission lacks the authority to 
engage in the climate change debate—a perspective one writer posits is “align[ed] 
with the conservative legal philosophy of the Federalist Society and FERC general 
counsel James Dany [now Commissioner], who espouses the theory of the ‘humble 
regulator,’ wherein interpreting the law to make policy is to be avoided.”238 
FERC’s approach is largely unsustainable under NEPA. Federal courts rou-
tinely demand that agencies adequately examine the indirect and cumulative effects 
from increased GHG emissions, and NEPA documents today invariably include an 
analysis of GHG emissions, albeit often an insufficient one.239 A report by the In-
stitute for Policy Integrity explains why NEPA requires examining the reasonably 
foreseeable direct and indirect upstream and downstream effects of a project, along 
with a robust alternatives analysis that includes a no additional natural gas op-
tion.240 
FERC initially could be optimistic when the D.C. Circuit rejected petitions 
for review in two cases alleging an insufficient analysis of increasing natural gas 
consumption.  The court accepted FERC’s argument that an insufficient causal 
 
similarly avoided meaningful discussion: FERC claimed it lacked the ability to determine the incremen-
tal impact and thus whether any impact was significant. And it rejected the suggestion that a sufficient 
causal relationship existed between pipeline approval and upstream GHG emission impacts. Id. para. 
52. 
 237. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 169 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Nat. 
Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 169 FERC ¶ 61,050 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Gulf LNG Liq-
uefaction Co., 168 FERC ¶ 61,020 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Mountain Valley Pipeline, 163 
FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018) (LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (order on reh’g). At 
a conference, Commissioner Glick opined he was against scrubbing climate change from the Commis-
sion’s orders. Edward Klump, Glick on Pipelines, Electricity, and the Climate ‘Scrub’, E&E NEWS (Sept. 27, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/09/27/stories/1061174425. 
 238. Rod Kuckro, McNamee, Glick Clash Over Climate, E&E NEWS (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/19/stories/1060757919. 
 239. E.g., Wildearth Guardians v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017); San Juan Citizens All. 
v. BLM, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. 2018); AquaAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 287 F. Supp. 
3d 969, 1032 (E.D. Cal. 2018); High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2018 WL 
3804099 (D. Colo. 2018); W. Org. of Res. Councils v. BLM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. 2018); 
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017), 
amended in part, affirmed in part, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. 2017); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
BLM, 2017 WL 3667700 (D. Nev. 2017); see generally Michael Berger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and 
Upstream Emissions Analysis: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2017); 
Arnold W. Reitze, Dealing with Climate Change Under the National Environmental Policy Act (University 
of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 320, 2019). But cf. James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline 
Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 150-
52, 162-63 (2018) (questioning need for upstream and downstream analyses). 
 240. JAYNI HEIN, JASON SCHWARTZ & AVI ZEVIN, PIPELINE APPROVALS AND GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS 12-19 (2019), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Pipeline_Approvals_
and_GHG_Emissions.pdf. 
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connection existed between its decision authorizing the redesign of an LNG facility 
in the Gulf Coast and the effects from consuming the exported gas in another 
country—when the decision to allow the export rested with DOE.241 The court al-
so dismissed petitioner’s claim that the LNG facility would induce more natural 
gas production downstream by accepting that “[t]he Commission reasonably ex-
plained that the asserted linkage was too attenuated to be weighed in its particular 
NEPA analysis.”242 
But recent pipeline opinions suggest such an analysis is not too attenuated. In 
Sierra Club v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed with FERC’s order that the 
downstream GHG effects from burning the transported gas was not reasonably 
foreseeable.243 In remanding FERC’s order, the court also asked the Commission 
to address whether it continued to believe that using a Social Cost of Carbon 
(SCC) for pipeline decisions was unnecessary.244 On remand, the Commission re-
instated the certificate after it accepted a supplemental EIS, concluding that it 
could not assess whether the downstream GHG emissions are significant and, con-
sequently, retained its prior analysis.245 Responding to the court’s invitation to ad-
dress again the efficacy of using an SCC, the Commission further reaffirmed its 
judgment that SCC is not a productive tool for project level pipeline decisions, 
primarily because it is not engaged in regional planning for either production or 
consumption.246 
FERC shortly thereafter prevailed—but realistically lost—its next major case. 
In Birckhead v. FERC, the court affirmed FERC’s failure to consider as indirect 
effects either the upstream or downstream GHG impacts.247 Notably, though, the 
court quoted counsel’s oral argument that “there may well be instances in which 
upstream gas production is both reasonably foreseeable and sufficiently causally 
connected to a pipeline project to qualify as an indirect effect.”248 Here, however, 
the court accepted the Commission’s judgment that the record lacked sufficient 
evidence that the particular pipeline was the only way to move the gas in the mar-
ket (a record lacking information because the question was never asked of the ap-
 
 241. Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 672 Fed. 
App’x 38 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Mem.) (following Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36). 
 242. Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 47; see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 672 Fed. App’x 38 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (companion case, with same judgment). In EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), the court again relied on Sierra Club, 827 F.3d 59, to reject requiring additional analysis of up-
stream (GHG emissions) and downstream effects (induced production from the Marcellus shale region) 
from FERC’s decision authoring changes to the Cove Point LNG facility. The court also accepted 
Commission’s decision not to use the SCC. EarthReports, 828 F.3d at 956. 
 243. Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 244. Id. at 1375. 
 245. Florida Southeast Connection, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233 (2018). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Broad Run Project). 
 248. Id. 
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plicant). The court distinguished Sierra Club by explaining how in that circum-
stance the destination and use of the natural gas was known—and here they “re-
main a mystery.”249 The court implicitly chastised the Commission for failing to 
obtain that missing information and, while upholding FERC’s decision, strongly 
intimated that the Commission must examine downstream GHG emission effects 
from natural gas combustion.250 
FERC Commissioners are now divided in a battle over how to address GHG 
emissions in pipeline orders. But it seems highly likely after Birckhead that such an 
analysis will be required, rather than be allowed to remain shrouded in “mystery” 
and avoided.251 Indeed, in a more recent per curiam opinion for the Atlantic Sunrise 
Project, the D.C. Circuit invoked Sierra Club, reasoning that “customers’ burning 
of the natural gas that the Project transports will produce greenhouse-gas emis-
sions . . . [and petitioners] are also correct that NEPA required the Commission to 
consider both the direct and indirect environmental effects of the Project, and that, 
despite what the Commission argues, the downstream greenhouse-gas emissions 
are just such an indirect effect.”252 
D.  FERC’s Gas Pipeline Policy Notice of Inquiry 
With all this turmoil, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in April 
2018, soliciting comments on its policies for certificating new natural gas transpor-
tation facilities.253 The agency’s existing policies date back almost two decades,254 
and the dramatic changes in the industry and markets since then prompted 
FERC’s interest in exploring possible changes to its regulatory program. The exist-
ing policy reflects decades of practice where the Commission “adopted an econom-
ic balancing test that weighs the public benefits of a project against its adverse im-
 
 249. Id. at 518. 
 250. Id. at 519-20. 
 251. The D.C. Circuit recently avoided the question in the challenge to the New Market Project, 
when several states and the District of Columbia urged the court “to recognize the straightforward prin-
ciple . . . that projects intended to increase the supply and transportation of natural gas also increase the 
amount of natural gas produced and consumed, with resulting environmental impacts, including [GHG] 
emissions that contribute to climate change.” Brief for New York et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 8-9, Otsego 2000 v. FERC, 767 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1188); see 
Ostego 2000 v. FERC, 767 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2019); see generally Pamela King, D.C. Circuit 
Won’t Revisit FERC Climate Battle, E&E NEWS (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060775337. 
 252. Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 932 F.3d 940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam), va-
cated, reh’g en banc granted, 943 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 2019). 
 253. Notice of Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,020 
(April 25, 2018), 163 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2018) (notice of inquiry). 
 254. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,277 (1999), 
clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2000), further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000). 
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pacts.”255 Benefits are then measured by market demand, illustrated by commit-
ments established in either contracts or precedent agreements.256 And FERC’s pol-
icy is principally designed to protect existing customers against cross-subsidization 
by allocating the risk of new construction on the pipeline and its shareholders.257 
Shortly after becoming Chairman, now former Charmain Kevin McIntyre an-
nounced it was time to take a “fresh look” and examine the “really hard ques-
tions.”258 Those “hard” questions elicited over 25,000 comments from interested 
stakeholders.259 A host of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) urged the 
Commission to review its approach for examining upstream and downstream 
GHG emission effects, and emphasized the importance of a more robust analysis 
of project need rather than relying almost exclusively on whether and how prece-
dent agreements establish a need for natural gas.260 Several state attorneys general 
similarly urged a wider consideration of the public interest that meaningfully ex-
plores market need over merely accepting precedent agreements, as well as examin-
ing the upstream and downstream GHG emission effects.261 They also expressed 
concern with the approach toward eminent domain and how the Commission’s use 
of conditional certificates affects a state’s authority to implement CWA § 401.262 
The industry, conversely, generally defended the Commission’s existing Certificate 
Policy and use of precedent agreements.263 And EPA informed the Commission on 
available tools for reviewing upstream and downstream GHG emission impacts.264 
 
 255. Christin, supra note 65, at 116. 
 256. Id. at 117; see also infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Christin, supra note 65, at 124, 128. “Instead of picking winners and losers,” it does this 
by “evaluat[ing] the public convenience and necessity of pipeline construction projects based on the 
demonstrated willingness of investors to risk capital in the market place.” Id. at 132. 
 258. Rod Kuckro & Jenny Mandel, FERC Tackles First Gas Policy Review Since 1999, E&E NEWS 
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060079613. 
 259. See Ellen M. Gilmer, Sam Mintz & Rod Kuckro, Commenters Swarm FERC to Push Reform—
and Status Quo, E&E NEWS (July 27, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/07/27/
stories/1060091321. 
 260. Public Interest Organizations, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas 
Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). 
 261. Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wash-
ington, and the District of Columbia, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facil-
ities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Natural Gas Council, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facili-
ties, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018); Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., Comment Letter 
on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018); Interstate 
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural 
Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). INGAA’s comments exceed 100 pages and de-
fend the existing certification policy. 
 264. Sam Mintz, EPA Advises FERC on Measuring Greenhouse Gases, E&E NEWS (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/06/22/stories/1060086219. EPA had earlier objected to FERC 
NEPA documents that ignored indirect effects from downstream natural gas combustion. E.g., Letter 
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IV.  EMBEDDED INFRASTRUCTURE AND POSSIBLY TOO MUCH GAS 
The shift away from coal-fired electric generation, coupled with changes in 
our transportation fuels, can reduce U.S. GHG emissions,265 but what happens to 
natural gas as the U.S. moves toward the necessity of a carbon-free economy? 
Moving forward, consequently, this last section proffers some suggestions. At 
the outset, topical issues such as pipeline safety and better coordination between 
PHMSA and FERC on siting of natural gas lines can be resolved, along with more 
careful attention by PHMSA toward plugging safety gaps.266 And conversations 
surrounding environmental compliance with the construction of new interstate 
natural gas pipelines must be taken seriously—and we should acknowledge rather 
than question the states’ important role in administering state water quality pro-
grams. FERC too should take seriously landowner concerns with the present emi-
nent domain process for interstate natural gas pipelines—and it appears likely that 
the D.C. Circuit will dictate that it does so.267 More fundamentally, FERC must, 
under NEPA and the NGA, acknowledge its role in exploring the GHG emissions 
associated with new interstate natural gas pipelines. Accordingly, the Commission 
must further explore the market need over time for natural gas, to avoid a potential 
stranded asset problem. 
To begin with, the debate in a few states surrounding §  401 of the CWA ap-
pears likely to remain a peripheral issue. Little suggests that states like New York 
are abusing their authority, but instead raising relevant issues tied to protecting 
water quality. Unless the Supreme Court weighs in and concludes that states do 
not waive their §  401 authority when extending the time for action by requiring a 
withdrawal and resubmittal of an application, it seems likely that outright denials 
of certification will follow, prompting pipeline applicants to adjust their behavior. 
One option promoted by Alex Klass and Jim Rossi would be to involve the state 
earlier in the pre-filing stages of the pipeline certification process.268 
 
from Kenneth A. Westlake, Chief, NEPA Implementation Section, Office of Enforcement and Com-
pliance Assurance, EPA, to Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, FERC, Oct. 11, 2016 (on file with author) 
(“We view FERC’s response to our comments as very concerning in light of CEQ’s GHG Guidance 
and request a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this matter before 
you publish a Record of Decision (ROD) and so that you do not continue to take this approach in addi-
tional NEPA documents.”). 
 265. Energy related CO2 rose in 2018 as a result of a warmer than normal summer and colder 
than normal winter, but EIA expects it will decrease in 2019 as temperatures normalize and more natu-
ral gas and renewables are deployed. EIA, SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK (Apr. 2019). 
 266. See Gosman, supra note 140. The two agencies have negotiated agreements involving 
PHMSA’s ability to issue letters of determination regarding safety for LNG facilities. FERC, Memo-
randum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation and the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas Transportation Facilities (Aug. 31, 2018). 
 267. See supra Section III.B. 
 268. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 
41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 480-81 (2017). 
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Next, FERC ought to consider remedying the difficulties confronting land-
owners intervening in the FERC process,269 and possibly preventing the transfer 
of property interests until a § 7 certificate is “effective.” The Commission’s dis-
claimer that the NGA and the judiciary hold all the cards is tautological270—both 
the NGA and the judiciary are subservient to FERC’s decision to award a certifi-
cate.  The Commission commensurately enjoys capacious authority to determine 
whether, when, and how a certificate can be considered “effective” for purposes of 
§ 7(h). Indeed, the Commission relies on its discretionary authority to even issue 
conditional certificates.271 New York, for instance, urges abandoning conditional 
certificates as one solution for landowners.272 Yet FERC, instead, could clarify that 
a certificate ought to become “effective” for purposes of eminent domain only 
when all required federal clearances or permits have been obtained. A pipeline 
company could commence other work, with voluntary agreements to access proper-
ty, or begin construction on property it owns or controls, but the federal right of 
eminent domain would not become operative until a certificate is “effective.” 
Many pipeline projects have tight construction schedules (often set by FERC and 
in precedent agreements with shippers),273 which contribute toward to the need for 
 
 269. This might include FERC reversing its recent policy of becoming less lenient on late inter-
ventions. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,167, para. 50 (“we will be less lenient in the grant 
of late interventions”); see also DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, at paras. 8-12 
(2018) (same). FERC also could explore ways to avoid the trap some litigants confront when they fail 
to appreciate the significance of raising issues during a proceeding, and then preserving issues by seek-
ing rehearing before proceeding to judicial review. See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 
61,197, at paras. 15-19 (2018) (order on reh’g) (explaining consequences); Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 
164 FERC ¶ 61,100, at para. 12 (2018) (untimely rehearing, and not preserving issues); see also Myers-
ville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a challenge 
to the absence of precedent agreements because issue was only presented in a footnote on rehearing). 
Another improvement might be to ensure that intervenors appreciate how, if they wish, to get access to 
confidential precedent agreements. Id. at 13 (noting ways to get access to some privileged and confiden-
tial documents). See Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,100 at paras. 15-25 (discussing access 
to precedent agreements). Since I first drafted this article, the Commission has initiated limited efforts 
to address some landowner concerns. See Niina H. Farah, FERC Vows Rapid Responses in Eminent Do-
main Legal Brawl, E&E NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020); https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2020/02/11/stories/1062319101; Jeremy Dillion, FERC Reorganizes to Address Landowner Disputes, E&E 
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2020) https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2020/02/03/stories/1062254577.  
 270. See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, at paras. 80-83. 
 272. Attorney General of the State of New York, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate 
Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (arguing against conditional certificates). 
 273. One court observed, when granting summary judgment, that “[c]onstruction timing is criti-
cal, and construction delays will result in lost contracts, the inability to comply with FERC require-
ments, and substantial financial losses that cannot be recouped.” Penneast Pipeline Co. v. Permanent 
Easement of 0.06 Acres in Moore Twn., 2019 WL 4447981 *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2019). Shippers may 
be loath to sign precedent agreements extending too long the period they will commit. In a FERC pro-
ceeding, such as with the MVP, participants will know the identity of the shippers, the maximum daily 
quantity, as well as the contractual terms. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, at pa-
ras. 9-10. 
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conditional certificates in the first place. A reasonable middle ground, therefore, 
might allow a certificate applicant to satisfy the terms of its reformulated prece-
dent agreements without risking inappropriately condemning property. Or, con-
versely, judges could exercise equitable power and reject preliminary injunction 
motions to obtain quick access to property.274 
Finally, agencies can take seriously their obligation under NEPA as well as 
their organic acts, whether the NGA, the MLA, or FLPMA to ensure that all envi-
ronmental and natural resource issues are thoroughly vetted. The obligation in-
cludes analyzing the full life-cycle GHG emissions both upstream and downstream 
from allowing the construction of a new natural gas pipeline.275 When necessary or 
where appropriate, agencies can respond by avoiding, mitigating, or minimizing 
any adverse effects on the climate, landscape, natural resources, and indigenous 
populations.276 The notion that GHG emissions are somewhat beyond the ken of 
the NGA’s “public interest” mandate is dubious. Section 7 of the NGA vests the 
Commission with broad authority, including the ability to “condition certificates in 
such manner as the public convenience and necessity may require.”277 Romany 
Webb’s analysis for the Sabin Center aptly demonstrates why NGA § 7 not only 
authorizes but prescribes a sufficient environmental analysis.278 Similarly, Har-
vard’s Electricity Law Initiative summarizes the historical understanding surround-
ing “public convenience and necessity” to explain why the Commission ought to 
amend its Certificate Policy Statement to ensure a full accounting of the “econom-
ic risks and environmental harms of downstream and upstream [GHG] emissions 
in a certificate proceeding.”279 And several U.S. Senators responded to FERC’s 
 
 274. See Pamela King, Federal Judge Rejects Md. Eminent Domain Bid, E&E NEWS (Aug. 22, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1061025035. The Fourth Circuit may soon decide 
whether the court enjoys such equitable power. See Niina H. Farah, Developer Fights Eminent Domain 
Denial in Md., E&E NEWS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061160131. 
 275. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text. This same problem surfaces with electric 
transmission lines, when agencies occasionally avoid meaningful analysis. See Nat’l Parks Conservation 
Ass’n v. Semonite, 925 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (court having to address pipeline construction al-
ready undertaken without adequate NEPA compliance). 
 276. Commission staff today generally actively monitor pipeline construction and environmental 
compliance. E.g., FERC Field Inspection Report, July 11, 2019 (for DTE Midstream Appalachia Birds-
boro Pipeline Project), Issuance No. 20190726-3001, available on FERC’s E-Library, Docket No. CP17-
458-000. 
 277. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959); see also Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 7 (1961) (broad discretionary authority); 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). New proceedings under § 7 arguably 
afford FERC broader authority than rate proceedings under §§ 4 and 5 for existing jurisdictional facili-
ties. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1988). 
 278. ROMANY M. WEBB, CLIMATE CHANGE, FERC, AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: THE 
LEGAL BASIS FOR CONSIDERING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE 
NATURAL GAS ACT (2019). 
 279. Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Comment Letter on Certification of New Interstate 
Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). Another study reviewed this history and 
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solicitation regarding its Certificate Policy by explaining why FERC ought to em-
ploy an SCC in its review of pipeline applications.280 
As described above, FERC should consider the environmental impacts of both 
upstream and downstream emissions when deciding whether to grant a § 7 certifi-
cate.281 But while such consideration is surely required and necessary, it is still 
woefully insufficient. Though not as devastating as coal-fired generation, natural 
gas-fired generation too is inimical to the long-term health of the planet. Pipeline 
infrastructure projects precipitate the urgency of addressing whether natural gas 
(a) should remain part of our energy economy at least through 2050; or (b) should 
only serve as a bridge fuel, and if so, for how long? It requires careful consideration 
of the environmental, economic, and technical feasibility of decarbonizing our en-
ergy economy between now and 2050. We also must determine whether, with the 
loss of coal-fired generation, the country has the renewable generation capacity—
with battery storage assumed—and transmission capacity to satisfy the projected 
electric demand if we avoid constructing many of these pipelines. Ideally, we 
should answer these questions before society either: a) invests billions in infra-
structure that might become stranded assets; or b) unduly tilts future decisions to-
ward a continuation of natural gas when it is no longer necessary. Of course, we 
could instead assume this infrastructure might become a stranded asset and plan 
accordingly. 
While it is well beyond the capacity of this article to examine the role of natu-
ral gas and answer either “a” or “b,” we presently lack an effective institutional 
mechanism for having the conversation. Predictive models can inform how much 
natural gas we have consumed and are likely to need over the next several years 
(and possibly decades, though with much less certainty).282 In 2016, natural gas 
consumption in the U.S. hovered around 75 billion cubic feet per day.283 That 
number rose to about 82.1 billion cubic feet per day by 2018, and could increase to 
84.6 in 2019, before remaining flat in 2020.284 An April 2019 study by the Boston 
 
confirms that “courts have allowed the Commission significant freedom to decide under what circum-
stances it should issue a certificate for pipeline construction.” Christin, supra note 65, at 120. In Minisink 
Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the court agreed with 
petitioners “that the Commission was obligated to consider, as part of its certificating process under the 
NGA, reasonable alternatives to the [proposed] project.” Admittedly, the issue there and the alleged 
inconsistency with City of Pittsburgh v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956) involved 
FERC’s treatment of future expansion, but the court emphasized the Commission’s “wide discretion.” 
Minisink, 762 F.2d at 107-09, 111. 
 280. Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, et al., Comment Letter on Certification of New Interstate Nat-
ural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). I agree that FERC ought to employ an 
SCC, but its utility only becomes meaningful if costs and benefits are considered on a macro level. 
 281. See supra Section III.C. 
 282. See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 226-27. 
 283. See NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, MACROECONOMICS OUTCOMES OF MARKET 
DETERMINED LEVELS OF U.S. LNG EXPORTS 22 (2018). 
 284. EIA, supra note 264 (Short-Term Energy Outlook). 
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Consulting Group suggests that natural gas demand could taper off, with supply 
exceeding demand, starting around 2020.285 But even predicting a year out requires 
appreciating the role of natural gas pricing for the power sector, weather events 
affecting residential and commercial use, and how the broader economic outlook 
will drive industrial use of natural gas.286 
These variables seem to push the industry toward short-term decisions on 
pipeline infrastructure. As of 2015, the nation had roughly 2.6 million miles of 
pipelines, as well as 414 natural gas storage facilities.287 Since 2016, FERC has ap-
proved annually between 30 and 40 pipeline projects.288 With a typical recourse 
rate of return on capital for new projects at 14%, investment makes sense.289 And 
the D.C. Circuit has indicated it is “ill-equipped to second guess the Commission’s 
expert judgment that 14% ROE with 50/50 equity/debt capital structure” is war-
ranted.290 If, however, delays and uncertainties occur in the approval process, that 
investment incentive lessens, and smaller projects in particular might be aban-
 
 285. ALEX DEWAR, DAVID GEE & TOM BAKER, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, PREPARING 
FOR AN ABUNDANCE OF US NATURAL GAS (Apr. 2019); see Edward Klump, Climate, Clean Tech Could 
Curb Demand for U.S. Gas-Study, E&E NEWS, Apr. 15, 2019.  
 286. EIA, supra note 264 (Short-Term Energy Outlook). 
 287. QER-1, supra note 94, at S-2. The Energy Department concluded that roughly half of the 
nation’s pipelines had been constructed in the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting that future investment would 
“range between $2.6 billion and $3.5 billion per year between 2015 and 2030, depending on the overall 
level of natural gas demand.” Id. at S-5. 
 288. See Rod Kuckro, Dominion Cancels Gas Pipeline, Blames FERC, E&E NEWS (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060678703. 
 289. For instance, the MVP proposed a capital structure of 60% capital investment, or equity, 
and 40% debt—at a 6% debt cost and a return on equity (ROE) of 14%, with a weighted average cost of 
capital at 10.8%. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 79-84 (2017). The Com-
mission responded that its 14% ROE policy applies “only where the equity component of the capitaliza-
tion is no more than 50%.” Id. This is because equity financing costs ratepayers more money: it is more 
costly than debt financing and debt financing is tax deductible. Id. at para. 80 (noting Commission’s 
policy in Fla. Se. Connection, LLC, 154 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2016) (order on reh’g), 165 FERC ¶ 61,160 
(2016) (vacated and remanded sub nom)); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1257). Yet, for the MVP, 
FERC noted how a 14% recourse ROE would sufficiently incent new market entrants such as the MVP, 
provided MVP alters its debt/equity ratio. Id. at paras 82-84. A recourse rate establishes a likely ceiling, 
with shippers capable of negotiating a slightly lower rate. It ostensibly avoids a company from over-
exercising market power. See N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 761 Fed. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2019) 
(challenging recourse rate, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). FERC further requires that the company 
file a rate study within 3 years, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043 para. 83 
(2017), at which point FERC might initiative a § 5 rate proceeding (unlikely) or the company could 
submit a § 4 rate change (again unlikely). The Commission appears reticent to change rates even when 
they may beyond an established zone of reasonableness. E.g., Wy. Interstate Co., 169 FERC ¶ 61,052 
(2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (questioning FERC’s decision not to change rates even though fed-
eral tax changes and a Commissioner order suggested rates should be lowered). Although a typical rea-
sonable rate affords a 10.55% ROE at a hypothetical capital structure of 57/43 equity/debt, rates often 
are part of a “black box” process. FERC, Rate Changes Relating to Federal Income Tax Rate, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 17,739, 17,744 (Apr. 26, 2019). 
 290. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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doned. For example, Dominion Energy recently announced it was abandoning the 
Sweden Valley Project, a 5-mile, $48 million project that would have delivered gas 
to Ohio.291 
Admittedly, the current Commission evinces little temperament for engaging 
in a longer-term analysis. Its Certificate Policy Statement, now under review,292 is 
designed to elicit information that will allow the Commission to balance the “pub-
lic benefits against the potential adverse consequences,” while affording “appropri-
ate consideration to the enhancement of competitive transportation alternatives, 
the possibility of overbuilding, subsidization by existing customers, the applicant’s 
responsibility for unsubscribed capacity, the avoidance of unnecessary disruptions 
of the environment, and the unneeded exercise of eminent domain in evaluating 
new pipeline construction.”293 But the policy sits on the shoulders of the Commis-
sion’s assumption that precedent agreements (or similar commitment agreements) 
reflect public benefits by establishing a market need.294 The Certificate Policy even 
acknowledges that transactions involving affiliated entities raise questions—albeit 
questions not examined by the Commission.295 The Policy further acknowledges 
that speculative projects ought to have more evidence of need, but little suggests 
any robust inquiry to avoid these issues.296 A cardinal objective, rather, appears to 
be ensuring that existing customers are not saddled with additional costs.297 
FERC’s approach for establishing market need—a corollary for concluding a pro-
ject serves the public convenience and necessity—is then reviewed deferentially by 
the courts.298 
Although former Commissioner Norman Bay expressed a willingness to ex-
plore market need more meaningfully,299 the Commission currently has elected 
 
 291. Rod Kuckro, Dominion Cancels Gas Pipeline, Blames FERC, E&E NEWS (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060678703. Dominion’s letter to FERC indicated its agreements re-
quired an in-service firm transportation service date of November 1, 2019, which meant receiving at the 
latest its FERC certificate by November 10, 2018, which had not even been granted as of the date of 
Dominion’s letter. Mathew R. Bley, Dominion Energy, Letter to FERC, June 28, 2019. 
 292. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 293. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2017), on reh’g 163 FERC ¶ 61,197 
(2018). 
 294. See infra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 295. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999) 
(Certificate Policy Statement), clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000). 
The earlier more stringent policy required firm commitments for at least 25% of the pipeline’s capacity. 
88 FERC, ¶ 61,743; see also Christin, supra note 65, at 124-26 (discussing historical and current policy). 
 296. 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 
(2000). 
 297. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 298. E.g., Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1311-15 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 299. See Separate Statement, National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 158 FERC ¶ 61,145, paras. 2-3 
(2017). 
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otherwise. The Commission’s tendency to avoid any principled inquiry into market 
need became pronounced in the MVP proceeding. Opponents argued that other 
projects already provided sufficient capacity, and approval of the MVP would re-
sult in over-building.300 MVP conversely furnished a Wood Mackenzie Study sug-
gesting that natural gas demand would “reach 8.3 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per day 
by 2030,” that this gas would have to come from the Marcellus and Utica for-
mations and, consequently, “would require additional pipeline capacity.”301 The 
Commission effectively avoided resolving this debate. Instead, it observed that 
MVP offered precedent agreements for the pipeline’s full design capacity. That 
sufficiently established market demand.302 Indeed, the Commission expressly 
opined it would not “examine the need for pipeline infrastructure on a region-wide 
basis.”303 To do so would require examining uncertain trends in “economic growth, 
the cost of natural gas, environmental regulations, and legislative and regulatory 
decisions by the federal government and individual states.”304 State policies for 
managing their “electric-power fuel source for the next 20 years” is equally too 
 
 300. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 34-43 (2017) (noting reports on 
need: DOE, NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED DEMAND FROM THE 
ELECTOR SECTOR; SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC. ARE THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE AND 
THE MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE NECESSARY? (2016); and INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY ECONOMICS 
AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL GAS EXPANSION IN APPALACHIA 
(Apr. 2016)). For Mountain Valley’s pending proposed 74-mile MVP Southgate project (MVP-
Southgate), a more recent Appalachian Voices funded study questioned the market demand in the 
North Carolina/Virginia region. Andrew M. Ballard, Need for Mountain Valley Pipeline Extension Ques-
tioned, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 1, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/need-for-mountain-valley-pipeline-extension-questioned. 
 301. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 39 (2017) (footnotes omitted) 
(referencing WOOD MACKENZIE, INC., SOUTHEAST U.S. NATURAL GAS MARKET DEMAND IN 
SUPPORT OF THE MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE PROJECT (Jan. 2016)). Project opponents noted that 
the Wood Mackenzie study “relies on data from an unusually cold winter and assumes gas will be flexi-
ble to meet the variable needs of generators.” Id. 
 302. Id. paras. 40-42 (albeit the Commission did take some “pot shots” at the studies). FERC 
noted how it would not explore the prudence of end user decisions to obtain natural gas, rather state 
regulators could assess a utility’s “ability to recover costs associated with its decision to subscribe for 
service.” Id. para. 53. The D.C. Circuit accepts the use of precedent agreements for establishing market 
demand. See Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 303. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 42 (2017). The Commission 
echoed this point later, asserting that it has “no way to accurately predict the scale, timing, and location 
of projects, much less the kind of facilities that will be proposed.” Id. paras. 138-40. 
 304. Id. para. 42. The Commission expressed little concern that the agreements may have been 
with affiliated entities, provided there is no evidence of discrimination. Mountain Valley Pipeline, 
LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 36 (2018). See also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 
61,043, at paras. 44-45 (2017) (declining to suggest the Commission should exercise additional scrutiny 
with affiliated precedent agreement transactions, absent evidence of anticompetitive behavior or dis-
crimination); Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085, para. 24 (2018) (only one agreement and 
that one with affiliated company for 87.5% of capacity, even when Missouri Public Service Commission 
expressed concerns); see generally Christin, supra note 65, at 128 (defending why affiliated transactions 
are unlikely to be shams). 
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speculative.305 And it observed that the EIS for the project suggested that “renew-
able energy is not a comparable replacement for the transportation of natural 
gas.”306 
The Commission, with one dissent, similarly approved the controversial 42-
inch, 600-mile, $7 billion Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) with marginal analysis of 
actual need for the natural gas.307 In authorizing the ACP to use Forest System 
lands for the right-of-way, the Service observed that the project would “serve the 
growing energy needs of multiple public utilities and local distribution companies 
in Virginia and North Carolina.”308 The agency also considered President Trump’s 
energy infrastructure executive orders and the need for timely approvals for such 
projects.309 The Commission’s rehearing order rejected as untimely a party’s new 
evidence questioning market need, reaffirming its practice to prohibit the introduc-
tion of new evidence at rehearing even if, as here, it may question the fundamental 
viability of a project.310 The Fourth Circuit faulted several aspects of the project, 
including faulty compliance with the ESA311 and inappropriate allowance of the 
Forest Service rather than the National Park Service to decide whether a right-of-
way through the Appalachian Trial is permissible under the National Trails Act.312 
But perhaps more consequential is the muted treatment of market demand. ACP’s 
owner “emphasized the project’s role in the transition from coal- to gas-fired pow-
er.”313 Yet some Virginia state legislators wrote FERC in July 2019 that recent fil-
ings by Dominion Energy suggest that natural gas demand had been overstated, 
possibly risking having ratepayers shoulder some of the project’s large capital 
costs.314 The lawmakers wrote that project demand, for then roughly $7.8 billion in 
 
 305. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 42-43 (2017). Elsewhere in its 
opinion, the Commission invoked Chevron deference to suggest its approach toward awarding certifi-
cates is broad under a step two analysis. Id. para. 60 n. 79. 
 306. Id. at 43. 
 307. See Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2017), 164 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2018) 
(order on reh’g). 
 308. USDA FOREST SERVICE, RECORD OF DECISION ON THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE 
PROJECT SPECIAL USE PERMIT/LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENTS, 17 
(2017). 
 309. Id. at 23. 
 310. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶61,100, paras. 17-19 (2018) (order on reh’g). 
 311. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 931 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2019); Sierra 
Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018). The court subsequently invalidated a 
state air permit. Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68 (4th Cir. 
2020). 
 312. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. grant-
ed 140 S. Ct. 36 (Oct. 4, 2019) (Nos. 18-1854 & 1587).  
 313. Pamela King, Pipeline Backers Set Stage for Appalachian Trail Fight, E&E NEWS (June 26, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/06/26/stories/1060656847. 
 314. Jeremy Dillon, Va. Lawmakers Oppose Atlantic Coast Project, E&E NEWS (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2019/07/16/stories/1060748451. 
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costs, entirely depended upon (96%) affiliated arrangements, and requested that 
FERC “issue a stop work order and suspend the Certificate” pending a new de-
mand study.315 
If we wish to avoid crisscrossing the nation with possible stranded assets or 
tethering us to a fossil fuel longer than necessary, some institutional mechanism 
must be deployed to engage directly in the inquiry FERC ostensibly disclaims. As 
the above case studies demonstrate, FERC is not meeting the challenge. Histori-
cally, the Federal Power Commission (FERC’s predecessor) examined national 
energy needs to inform policy-level decisions.316 For hydroelectric development, 
although largely irrelevant in modern hydroelectric relicensing proceedings,317 
Congress charged the Commission with examining regional planning.318 Every 
year the Energy Information Administration provides both long-term and short-
term analyses of projected production and demand of energy resources.319 More 
recently, the Energy Department engaged in infrastructure assessments—an in-
quiry FERC could have coordinated with DOE.320 When assessing the impact of 
allowing LNG exports, DOE also performed several market-wide inquiries.321 
DOE earlier explored on a macro-level the nation’s transmission system and con-
straints and bottlenecks.322 DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable En-
 
 315. Letter from R. Creigh Deeds, Virginia State Senator, et al., to Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary 
of FERC (July 11, 2019) (on file with publisher). 
 316. E.g., FPC, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL POWER 
COMMISSION (1970); FPC, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL POWER 
COMMISSION (1964). The 1970 report “serve[d] as a general long-range guide rather than a directive or 
firm plan. It illustrates possible patterns of efficient development based upon assumptions outlined in 
the report and with the passage of time, modifications to reflect variances from the assumptions will be 
in order.” 1970 FPC REPORT, supra at I-iii. During the war, the Commission also compiled information 
for future demand needs. Philip L. Cantelon, The Regulatory Dilemma of the Federal Power Commission, 
1920-1977, 4 FED. HIST. J. 61, 69 (2012).  
 317. See generally Sam Kalen, Essay: Historical Flow of Hydroelectric Regulation: A Brief History, 53 
IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 318. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(a) (2006) (examining plans for the use of water resources on a regional 
basis); 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2006) (the Commission may give preference to an applicant’s plans that 
are “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways”); see 
also 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (2006) (the Commission also has the authority to examine “the public interest 
to conserve and utilize the navigation and water-power resources of the region.”). 
 319. See generally EIA, https://www.eia.gov.  
 320. See DOE Procedures for Conducting Electric Transmission Congestion Studies, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 42,647 (Aug. 23, 2018); QER-1, supra note 94. 
 321. DOE Study on Macroeconomic Outcomes of LNG Exports, 83 Fed. Reg. 27,314, 27,315 
(June 12, 2018) (describing five studies, and focusing on the 2018 macroeconomic study). A DOE com-
missioned study concluded, assuming no additional regulatory constraints on LNG exports, that the 
United States would export roughly between 3.2 and 11.2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year by 2040. 
NERA, supra note 282, at 14. 
 322. DOE, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY (2002) (submitted to the White House as 
part of the National Energy Policy); National Transmission Grid Study 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,460 
(Sept. 21, 2001). 
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ergy (aided by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory) also has examined nec-
essary infrastructure for plug-in electric vehicles.323 When necessary, moreover, 
FERC could always enlist the aid of another agency—the State Department, after 
all, asked DOE to perform a critical analysis to assist the State Department’s deci-
sion on the Keystone XL oil pipeline.324 And notably, FERC staff issues reliability 
reports, examining projected weather and grid capacity and reliability, as well as 
projected natural gas prices—all factors FERC posits would be necessary to engage 
in regional-wide planning.325 
When FERC or DOE anticipate the need to gather information or craft poli-
cies to adapt to market changes, they act. After all, without congressional directive, 
FERC restructured both the natural gas and electric utility industries.326 FERC 
and DOE, more indicatively, are working on how to better integrate natural gas 
systems and the electric grid.327 Natural gas fired power plants require delivery of 
the gas, and occasionally during cold weather when gas is diverted toward heating 
needs or there is an emergency in the system, the power sector is short.328 Begin-
ning around roughly 2012, as our energy portfolio shifted from coal toward natural 
gas, the Commission began exploring barriers to effective coordination between 
electric utilities and natural gas companies.329 DOE too has been working with the 
natural gas pipeline industry to develop a computer model capable of assisting in 
coordination of the electric grid with the gas industry and cybersecurity.330 
 
 323. DOE, NATIONAL PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS (Sept. 
2017). 
 324. See Sam Kalen, Thirst for Oil and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 21-22 
(2012). 
 325. FERC, SUMMER 2019 RELIABILITY AND ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT (2019); see also 
FERC, WINTER 2018-19 ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT (Oct. 2018). 
 326. See generally NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 54-97. 
 327. See, e.g., Order No. 809, Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas 
Pipelines and Public Utilities, 151 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2015); see also Natalie Karas, Resilience Proceeding 
Gives FERC a Chance to Advance Gas-Electric Coordination, EDF (May 9, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/
energyexchange/2018/05/09/resilience-proceeding-gives-ferc-a-chance-to-advance-gas-electric-
coordination/.  
 328. Jay Apt, Gerad Freeman & Michael Dworkin, The Natural Gas Grid Needs Better Monitoring, 
34 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 4 (2018) (urging better reporting requirements).   
 329. Request for Comments of Commissioner Moeller on Coordination Between the Natural 
Gas and Electricity Markets (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/electric-
coord/moellergaselectricletter.pdf; Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines; 
Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines and Public Utilities, 153 
FERC ¶ 61,061 (2016); Communication of Operational Information Between Natural Gas Pipelines 
and Electric Transmission Operators, 145 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2013) (Order 787), 147 FERC ¶ 61,228 
(2014) (order on reh’g) (Order No. 787-A). 
 330. Peter Behr & Jeremy Dillon, Electricity Chief on Gas, the Grid, and “Real-Time” Models, E&E 
NEWS (July 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060784981. Electricity moves at the 
speed of light, while natural gas travels at roughly a little over 20 mph; historically, natural gas operated 
on daily cycle that started at 10:00am, while electric power generators used a 12 to 12 cycle. Such dis-
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The NGA’s obligation to consider the public convenience and necessity is 
surely capacious enough to consider, as the Harvard Electricity Institute and Rom-
any Webb note, project contributions toward climate change, but to support as well 
any Commission policy of engaging in larger market studies.331 FERC, after all, 
describes part of its mission as “[p]romot[ing] the development of safe, reliable, 
and secure infrastructure that serves the public interest.”332 It recognizes that “the 
nation’s energy infrastructure and energy markets must adapt” to the “significant 
changes in energy supply,” such as “the increased availability of domestic natural 
gas and the emergence and growth of new energy technologies.”333 It enjoys wide 
discretion to consider “all factors bearing on the public interest,” whether the end 
use of the gas or the effects of its decision.334 If, however, FERC eschews critically 
examining market need, it cannot accomplish its mission. It cannot know whether 
it is approving projects that serve the public interest today, or into the future as 
new energy technologies emerge and grow. 
This is evident in the Commission’s treatment of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
discussed earlier,335 as well as the proposed 65-mile interstate Spire STL Pipeline 
Project (Spire), owned by a new pipeline market entrant with no existing custom-
ers.  The only committed gas (87.5%) for the Spire project is a 20-year agreement 
with Spire Missouri.336 Spire and Spire Missouri are wholly owned by the same 
entity, Spire, Inc. Both Missouri River Transmission, an existing almost 700-mile 
pipeline that would connect with Spire, as well as the Missouri Public Service 
Commission, expressed concerns with the project. Furthermore, protesters are 
concerned that “Spire’s proposed new pipeline is unneeded to meet what is de-
scribed as flat demand in the St. Louis metropolitan area.”337 Regardless of wheth-
er the protesters are correct, FERC shirked its obligation by deploying its Certifi-
cate Policy as a shield against any meaningful inquiry. The Commission explored 
 
crepancies prompted examining daily schedules. See Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Inter-
state Natural Gas Pipelines and Public Utilities, 151 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2015) (Order No. 809). 
 331. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. To date, the contrary argument rests almost en-
tirely on the two cases discussed by Webb and the Harvard Electricity Institute. See NAACP v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1976); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line, 365 
U.S. 1, 7-8, 19-20, 30-31 (1961); see also James Costan, FERC Should Not Review Pipeline Downstream 
Climate Impact, LAW360 (July 31, 2019), www.law360.com/articles/1183220. 
 332. FERC, FISCAL YEAR 2018 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT i (2018). 
 333. FERC, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022 v (2018). 
 334. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. at 7-8, 23. The Transcon Court carefully delineated 
between the Commission’s wide discretion to consider all factors and its authority to regulate certain are-
as. The Court accepted the Commission’s consideration of end use of the gas as well as air pollution and 
reversed the lower court’s (Consolidated Edison Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 271 F.3d 942 (3d Cir. 
1959)) holding the Commission lacked power to consider conservation. Id. at 30-31. 
 335. See supra notes 165, 299, and accompanying text. 
 336. Spire STL Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018). 
 337. Id. para. 18; see also id. para. 49. 
_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020  12:21 PM 
370 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 9:2 
 
Spire’s anticipated hypothetical cost of gas over a 20 year period,338 but it blandly 
applied its Certificate Policy and accepted a singular precedent agreement with an 
affiliated company without further inquiry.339 It rejected the need for any market 
study, unless there is an affirmative showing of anti-competitive behavior or dis-
crimination.340 The Commission, moreover, disclaimed the appropriateness of ex-
amining market need in the alternatives analysis under NEPA.341 As intervenor 
Environmental Defense Fund reported after FERC’s decision, “[t]he proceeding 
reveals much about how the agency assesses the legally-required ‘market need’ for 
new pipelines when both buyer and seller in the contract used to demonstrate that 
market need are two different arms of the same company,” with the risk “that we 
could end up with expensive new pipelines that aren’t needed.”342 
A significant barrier confronting any macro inquiry by FERC or any other in-
stitution on market need is the myriad of actors affecting our energy economy. 
Some state or local governments remain in pitched battles over allowing any pro-
duction, regulating well-spacing or fracking, prohibiting flaring, or, as in Colorado, 
incorporating environmental considerations into new well approvals.343 Federal 
land managing agencies, conversely, affect how much production can occur off the 
nation’s public lands—often shifting with the political winds. Then, of course, 
many pipeline facilities require some form of approval from more than FERC 
alone, including the PHMSA (for safety),344 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(for CWA permits),345 or the Bureau of Land Management (for rights of way).346 
 
 338. Id. para. 54. 
 339. Id. paras. 72-87. Because Spire Missouri is not a jurisdictional entity, no requirement existed 
for an open season to solicit bids from prospective shippers.   
 340. Id. para. 81. It further added that “we believe that any attempt by the Commission to look 
behind the precedent agreements in this proceeding might, in fact, interfere with the state regulators’ 
role in determining the prudence of expenditures by the utilities that they regulate.” Id. para. 87. This 
was odd, given that the state regulator in the proceeding was asking for additional review. 
 341. Id. paras. 207-17. Dissenting, Commissioner Glick lamented that the Commission had given 
the application an “anemic review” and “lends credence to the critique that the Commission does not 
meaningfully review section 7 applications.” Spire STL Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085, para. 1 
(2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 342. Natalie Karas, FERC Approves Pipeline Despite Concern Over Controversial Business Arrange-
ment, EDF (Aug. 10, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2018/08/10/ferc-approves-pipeline-
despite-concern-over-controversial-business-arrangement/. Local farmers recently filed a complaint at 
FERC alleging that the company is damaging their property and asked that FERC halt construction. 
Mike Soraghan, Famers Press FERC to Block Pipeline Launch, E&E NEWS (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/28/stories/1061394825. The Commission denied rehearing 
Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2019), and the case is pending before the D.C. Circuit. 
Mike Soraghan, FERC Approval of Gas Project Challenged in Court, E&E NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1062152537.  
 343. See Tara Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 344. See supra note 139. 
 345. See supra note 143. 
 346. See 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1992).   
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When we next shift from production to consumption, residential and commer-
cial natural gas usage is regulated at the state or local level.347 Here, programs vary 
and remain in flux. Some local communities have or are considering precluding 
natural gas from new construction,348 while others encourage energy efficient 
buildings and homes.349 Furthermore, states are unveiling an array of different 
climate programs, ranging from renewable portfolio standards350 to aggressive 
campaigns to reduce GHG emissions from within their borders. Just a few exam-
ples: California’s goal is to reach 100% of its electricity from clean energy by 2045; 
Hawaii too hopes to reach 100% clean energy by 2045;351 and New Jersey expects 
to reduce its emissions 80% below 2006 levels by 2050.352 Even the “poor but fos-
sil-fuel rich state” of New Mexico has targeted a carbon-free grid by 2045.353 Ne-
vada will require that utilities obtain half their generation from renewable re-
sources, and the state has a goal of having all the state’s electric generation carbon-
free by 2050.354 Oregon too may opt for reducing its emissions by 80% below 1990 
 
 347. See generally State and Local Policy Database, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECONOMY, https://database.aceee.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
 348. After Berkeley, California “banned the use of natural gas in most new buildings,” other Cal-
ifornia cities considered following suit, along with other cities, such as Philadelphia. Andrew Maykuth, 
One City Just Banned New Natural Gas Hookups to Save the Planet: Could Philly Follow Suit?, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, July 19, 2019. San Jose next banned new residential hook-ups. See Haley Weiss & Anne C. 
Mulkern, San Jose Approves Proposal Banning Residential Natural Gas, E&E NEWS (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2019/09/18/stories/1061135071. Conversely, Arizona opted to pre-
vent local cities from adopting bans on new natural gas hookups. Carlos Anchondo, State Preempts Local 
Bans on Natural Gas Hookups, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1062439547.  
 349. See State Policy Program, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, 
https://aceee.org/sector/state-policy (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). New technologies, such as advanced 
metering infrastructure, might promote greater efficiency in natural gas usage at the residential and 
commercial level. See ROMANY WEBB, DEPLOYING ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE ON 
THE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM: REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2018). 
 350. See U.S. State Electricity Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS 
(Nov. 2019), https://www.c2es.org/document/renewable-and-alternate-energy-portfolio-
standards/. “As of the end of 2018, 29 states and the District of Columbia had [RPSs].” Updated Re-
newable Portfolio Standards Will Lead to More Renewable Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38492. 
 351. H.R. 623, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015). 
 352. Climate Change, N.J DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., https://www.nj.gov/dep/climatechange/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 353. Nathan Rott, In Midst of An Oil Boom, New Mexico Sets Bold New Climate Goals, NPR (Mar. 
13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/13/702877664/in-midst-of-an-oil-boom-new-mexico-sets-bold-
new-climate-goals. 
 354. S. 358, 2019 Leg. 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019); Catherine Morehouse, Nevada Passes Bill for 50% 
Renewables by 2030, 100% Carbon Free by 2050, NCEL (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.ncel.net/
2019/04/22/nevada-passes-bill-for-50-renewables-by-2030-100-carbon-free-by-2050/. The City of Las 
Vegas became committed to only renewable energy for government buildings and infrastructure in 
2016. C. Moon Reed, Climate Change in Nevada Can Be Stopped With Our Help, L.V. SUN (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2019/mar/01/climate-change-in-nevada-can-be-stopped-with-our-h/. 
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levels by 2050.355 New York, which openly opposes some new pipeline construc-
tion,356 targets having 70% of its electricity generated from renewables by 2030, 
and slashing emissions considerably by 2050.357 A few years earlier, New York even 
developed a Methane Reduction Plan, proposing to slash methane emissions con-
siderably by 2050 (80% from 1990 levels).358 Meanwhile, though, other states are 
considering barriers to renewable generation.359 
Private sector initiatives further compound planning, as both industry and 
consumers are altering markets for natural gas.360 Increasingly, large industrial 
 
 355. Cassandra Profita, Contentious Oregon Climate Plan Takes Lessons From Californa’s Mistakes, 
NPR (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/729594169/contentious-oregon-climate-plan-
takes-lessons-from-californias-mistakes. Portland has been involved in climate actions since 1993, and is 
currently working to reduce its emission by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050. CITY OF PORTLAND AND 
MULTNOMAH CTY. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN SUMMARY, 9, 15 (2015). Oregon’s Governor also talks 
about decarbonizing the state’s natural gas grid with renewable natural gas. KATE BROWN & KRISTEN 
SHEERAN, OREGON CLIMATE AGENDA: A STRONG, INNOVATIVE, INCLUSIVE ECONOMY WHILE 
ACHIEVING STATE CLIMATE EMISSIONS GOALS 10 (2018). 
 356. See Sam Mintz & Peter Behr, Top Staffer Plunges FERC Into Trump’s Coal, Nuclear Fight, 
E&E NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060093711 (discussing criticism by now 
former FERC staffer of Governor Cuomo’s efforts to block a pipeline). 
 357. Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, 2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 106 (statewide 
GHG emissions are to be reduced by 60% from 1990 levels by 2030, and then to 15% of 1990 levels by 
2050). According to a legislator’s press release, the bill will “require 70 percent of the electric generation 
secured by load serving entities regulated by the Public Service Commission to be produced by renewa-
ble energy systems by 2030. Additionally, the bill requires that the statewide electrical demand system 
will be zero emissions by 2040. The measure would spur the procurement of at least nine gigawatts of 
offshore wind electric generation by 2035, six gigawatts of distributed photovoltaic solar generation by 
2025, three gigawatts of statewide energy storage capacity by 2030 and 185 trillion BTUs of end use 
energy savings below the 2025 energy use forecast.” News Release, Assembly Passes Climate Leader-
ship and Community Protection Act, (June 20, 2019) (on file at https://nyassembly.gov/
Press/files/20190620.php); see generally Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New Climate Law 
Will Reshape NY’s Key Sectors, 8 N.Y.L.J. 262 (2019). Also in June 2019, the New York City Council 
declared a climate emergency. City Council Res. 864 (N.Y.C. 2019). 
 358. Maxine Joselow, N.Y.’s Cuomo Announces Emissions-Reduction Plan, E&E NEWS (May 18, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2017/05/18/stories/1060054720. The plan identifies 25 ac-
tions, including “formalizing and standardizing the process of reviewing new transmission infrastructure 
projects, deploying methane detection systems in residential areas, and prioritizing the repair of pipe-
line leaks.” Id. Other states, such as California, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have tak-
en varying steps toward reducing emissions as well. Id.; see also Mike Lee, Pa. Finalizes Emissions Plan for 
New Gas Wells, E&E NEWS (June 8, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060083865 
(describing program, including the use of Best Available Technology for reducing leaks). 
 359. See, e.g., Jefferey Tomich, Strangled Ohio Wind Industry: ‘We Don’t Want to Give Up’, E&E 
NEWS (July 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060727747. 
 360. See Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11049 (2018) (discussing MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. 
GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2017)); Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: The Mitigation Potential of 
Private Climate Governance, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote: 
Motivating Private Climate Governance: The Role of the Efficiency Gap, 71 ARK. L. REV. 349 (2018); Mi-
chael P. Vandenbergh & Daniel J. Metzger, Symposium on Corporate Sustainability in the Era of Shifting 
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purchasers are demanding renewably generated electric power.361 Concurrent with 
President Trump’s early efforts to boost fossil fuels, large industrial customers 
conversely were exploring direct purchases of renewable energy.362 Utilities are 
beginning to propose zero-carbon plans and phaseouts of natural gas.363 In the 
transportation sector, the movement toward electric vehicles continues, and current 
policies are unlikely to hinder planning by the world’s automobile manufactur-
ers.364 
This all renders the task of planning fluid and complex, but it does not justify 
abandoning it altogether. FERC should engage in planning and a broader assess-
ment of market need, rather than abjectly accepting even dubious precedent 
agreements. Critically examining need will allow greater consumer engagement by 
having consumers acknowledge the stranded asset problem and affording them a 
choice during project inception. State utility commissions could adopt programs 
enabling consumers who ultimately pay the rates for the natural gas to examine the 
potential stranded asset problem, and consider accepting the imposition of some 
cost-adder to ensure the infrastructure remains justified in the long run.365 Nation-
al Grid, which serves over 3 million customers in the Northeast and hopes to re-
duce its carbon emissions by 80% by 2050, recently illustrated how this could be 
done.366 In July 2019, the utility sent notices to some customers urging their sup-
port for a 23.5-mile Northeast Enhancement Supply Project that would provide 
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gas to New Yorkers.367 Project opponents argue that this “massive 1 billion-dollar 
project is based on fundamentally flawed, unsupported arguments about increasing 
demand for pipeline gas in National Grid’s service area.”368 As New Yorkers brace 
for the move to a carbon net-zero future by 2050, National Grid could instead di-
rectly address both present and future market need and commit to a program for 
decommissioning or, at least, ensuring that it will become carbon neutral by 2050 
and that customers will not shoulder any costs of decommissioning the infrastruc-
ture or necessary new technological enhancements that could have been avoided.369 
Of course, another option might be just accepting that our insurance and bankrupt-
cy laws will address adverse consequences of stranded assets—a dubious assump-
tion as the nation witnesses how coal mining bankruptcies are disrupting local 
communities and employees.370 Alternatively, the government could intervene 
with funding.371 
While this article does not purport to offer the ideal path forward, three ob-
servations seem undeniable. To begin with, we must not let the oddity of jurisdic-
tional boundaries presented by overlapping governmental institutions impair our 
ability to reach deep decarbonization by 2050. That means, second, that expanding 
our natural gas system infrastructure cannot proceed blindly without any meaning-
ful assessment of present and future need. Finally, any assessment of need must 
address (a) how we can limit additional infrastructure and avoid a stranded asset 
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that possibly incentivizes keeping that asset operational longer than necessary, or 
(b) how we can deploy quickly enough technological tools for allowing natural gas 
in both the power sector and residential/industrial sectors to become carbon neu-
tral by no later than 2050. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The disparate battles against pipelines converge to form a mosaic portraying 
the evolving war against pipelines. Unfortunately, it is war being waged on the 
wrong turf. For far too long, our energy policy has been marred by such interne-
cine skirmishes. Opponents look for weaknesses: whether a particular pipeline can 
be impeded by the ESA or the CWA; whether a limitation can be found in federal 
eminent domain authority; or whether a project can be challenged for lacking a suf-
ficiently robust environmental analysis under NEPA or the NGA. Meanwhile, 
proponents tout the benefits of natural gas and its accompanying infrastructure, 
such as its abundance, low cost, and reduced GHGs compared to coal. But rarely 
do we examine that infrastructure itself—natural gas pipelines and their longevity. 
To be sure, the necessity of examining that infrastructure is nothing new. Over six-
ty years ago, one observer lamented that “little attention has been accorded to the 
thought that we may be overexpanding pipeline capacity.”372 The fear then was 
that additional infrastructure would incent depleting natural gas reserves that had 
to be conserved,373 while today the fear is more ominous—an incentive to rely on a 
GHG emitting fossil fuel, or saddle our economy with billions in stranded invest-
ments. Reliance on natural gas in the southeastern United States, for example, may 
hinder that region’s ability to reach a zero-carbon emission goal by 2050.374 
Historical energy transitions generally occur during periods when state-
created or sanctioned institutional mechanisms surface to address emergent and 
feasible technologies, market shifts, changes in resource availability, or adverse ex-
ternalities—smog, acid rain, mercury emissions, or GHGs.375 Each time we take 
such a targeted step, we affect more than the target itself—creating a feedback loop 
that adds complexity to the energy transition.376 Shortages of interstate natural gas 
contribute to touting the benefits of the nation’s abundant coal resources.377 Re-
ducing sulfur emissions from eastern coal precipitates either fuel switching or de-
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veloping western (and other) low sulfur coal resources.378 Replacing retiring coal-
fired electric power capacity with renewable resources may require additional 
transmission lines, while replacing the lost coal-fired electric generation with natu-
ral gas may prompt more pipeline construction. 
Today, however, our energy transition is sui generis. To begin with, the urgen-
cy of reducing or eliminating our carbon economy—or at least our carbon-emitting 
economy—is pushing states and local communities to act swiftly while Congress 
and federal agencies act slowly. Whether as subsidies for non-fossil generation, re-
newable portfolio standards, new climate programs, or other indirect mechanisms 
for affecting generation resources, states and local communities are changing the 
face of the national energy grid—both for natural gas and electric transmission. 
Next, technological advancements are moving faster than regulatory bodies can re-
spond. As this unfolds, our grid will need to expand to accommodate increased ca-
pacity from the transportation sector. That may mean ensuring that CO2 emissions 
from oil (gasoline) are not shifted from the transportation sector to a natural-gas 
dependent electric power sector. Battery technology and small modular nuclear re-
actors are progressing apace as well, all likely to influence dramatically the electric 
grid of the future—a grid that many hope will be more distributed, with locally 
generated carbon-free resources. Increased energy efficiency, coupled with declin-
ing costs for both wind and solar power, as well as enhancements and potential re-
duced costs for battery technology, all render the future energy economy fluid. 
Unpredictable. Added to technological advancements are how institutions and our 
legal system may hinder advancements, perhaps best illustrated by the present 
fight over the Commission’s approach toward energy storage.379 Too many varia-
bles, therefore, make this energy transition more difficult than those experienced 
in the past. Our goal is simply a clean energy economy with many technological 
innovations, market developments, and institutional paths for getting there. 
And our problem is that infrastructure, such as natural gas pipelines, attends 
each of those paths. We nevertheless continue to make decisions without sufficient 
acknowledgment and inquiry into whether that infrastructure will remain economi-
cally and environmental sound and viable for a sufficiently long period, without 
compromising our flexibility for moving toward a green economy and adjusting 
with technological, cultural, market, and institutional changes.380 FERC’s policy 
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toward natural gas pipelines exemplifies this abject willingness to proceed blindly 
into the future. It decries the utility of examining macro-level questions, captured 
instead by the ease and allure of examining individual pipeline decisions with hard-
ly any inquiry into present let alone future need. Our environment and economy 
demand otherwise. 
 
